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"OWING TO THE EXTREME YOUTH OF
THE ACCUSED": THE CHANGING LEGAL
RESPONSE TO JUVENILE HOMICIDE
DAVID S. TANENHAUS* AND STEVEN A. DRIZIN**
These [juvenile] laws were drafted at a time when kids were throwing spit-
balls .... Now they're committing murders.
- Carolea Goldfarb, Brooklyn District Attorney's Juvenile Division, 1994.
Our juvenile criminal act was written at a time when kids were knocking over
outhouses, not killing people. We're looking at a whole new breed here.
- Eileen O'Neill, Cook County Assistant States Attorney, 1994.2
Our juvenile justice system was created at a time of more 'Leave it to Beaver'
type crimes, less sophisticated and not incredibly violent. But what we see now
is kids who have never been socialized properly . .. who are real predators ....
Realistically that's what we're trying to deal with.
- Peter Deddeh, Chief of the San Diego District Attorney's Division, 1996.
[The juvenile justice] system was developed with truants, vandals, and petty
thieves in mind. But this model is not appropriate for the violent juvenile of-
fender of today.
- Linda J. Collier, Lecturer at Cabrini College, 1998."
* David S. Tanenhaus is Associate Professor of History and Law at the University of Ne-
vada, Las Vegas.
Steven A. Drizin is Associate Clinical Professor of Law at Northwestern University.
Patricia Hurtado, Legal Cracks in the Juvenile Justice System, NEWSDAY, July 4, 1994,
at A6.
2 Neil Steinberg, Judge Convicts Boy, 11, in Woman's Slaying, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 7,
1994, at 14.
'Adam Pertman, States Racing to Prosecute Young Offenders as Adults, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 11, 1996, at I.
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In the late 1980's and early 1990's, an alarming increase in the
number of juvenile homicides spurred academics like John DiIulio of
Princeton and James Alan Fox of Northeastern University to predict a
coming tidal wave of "remorseless and morally impoverished youth."
These predictions, which were based solely on projected increases in
the nation's youth population, fueled the concern that the juvenile
court was ill-equipped to deal with this new "breed" of delinquent,
the so-called "juvenile superpredator."I State and local prosecutors
and crime conservatives jumped on the "superpredator" bandwagon,
adopting the rhetoric in a full-scale assault on the legitimacy of thejuvenile court. They referred to the court as "outdated" and claimed
that the court was never intended to deal with serious and violent ju-
venile offenders, and instead proposed legislation to dismantle sys-
tematically the remaining protective elements of the juvenile court.
State legislatures heeded the call for tougher juvenile laws, and
between 1990 and 1996, forty states passed laws to make it easier to
prosecute juveniles as adults.6 Many of these new laws removed dis-
cretion from juvenile court judges and gave more power to prosecu-
tors, resulting in less individualized justice and more decisions based
solely on the nature of the charged offense. Along similar lines, ju-
venile records, which had been confidential, were made widely ac-
cessible; juvenile proceedings, which had been closed to the public,
were opened in certain cases; and statutes that had stressed "rehabili-
tation" and "the best interest of the child," were rewritten to empha-
size "punishment" and "the protection of the public."7
Despite the fact that juvenile crime declined significantly from
1994 to 2000, while the number of juveniles in the population simul-
taneously increased, prosecutors and politicians continued to call for
tougher juvenile laws. This trend-lower rates of juvenile crime and
an increasing juvenile population, completely discredited the "super-
predator" theory, and led some of the academics who supported it to
4 Linda Collier, Adult Crime, Adult Time, Outdated Juvenile Laws Thwart Justice, WASH.
POST, Mar. 29, 1998, at CI.
5 John Dilulio, Jr., Moral Poverty: The Coming of the Super-Predators Should Scare Us
Into Wanting to Get to the Root Causes of Crime A Lot Faster, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 1995, at
31. For a devastating critique of the predictions of a "coming wave" of juvenile crime see
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998), especially ch. 4.
6 THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE
CRIMINAL COURT 4 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
7 MELISSA SICKMUND, ET. AL., U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 30 (1997).
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back away from their earlier predictions.' In fact, on January 17,
2001, the United States Surgeon General released a report in which
he declared the "superpredator" theory a myth, finding that "there is
no evidence that the young people involved in violence during the
peak years of the early 1990's were more frequent or more vicious
offenders than youth in earlier years." 9
The continuing angry rhetoric of alarmists, however, convinced
the public that there was still an epidemic of juvenile crime in Amer-
ica, and allowed the "superpredator" myth to continue to drive juve-
nile justice policy."0 For instance, in defending a federal bill, which
would have allowed thirteen-year-olds to be jailed with adults, Con-
gressman Bill McCollum declared of America's children: "They're
the predators out there, they're not children anymore. They're the
most violent criminals on the face of the earth."'"
In this heated climate, between 1996 and 1999, forty-three states
tinkered further with their transfer laws, increasing the numbers of
children tried as adults and housed in adult prisons. According to
Amnesty International, in 1998 nearly 200,000 children under eight-
een were tried as adults; some 18,000 children- were housed in adult
prisons, 3500 of whom shared living spaces with adults. 12 By the
close of the twentieth century, the American juvenile court faced its
greatest legitimacy crisis to date.13
8 See, e.g., David J. Krajicek, Super-Predators. The Making of a Myth, YOUTH TODAY,
Apr. 1999, at 1, available at http://www.ytyt.org/infobank/document.cfm/parent/502/103/
(last visited Feb. 10, 2003); Jacques Steinberg, Youth Crime Wave Seems Washed Up,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 3, 1999 at A21; Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young
'Super-Predators', Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at Al0.
9 YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5 (2001). The criminologist
John Laub has argued that over the course of the twentieth century criminologists have in-
vented new labels to describe basically the same population of serious and violent juvenile
offenders, and the that term "superpredators" was only the latest such label. John Laub, A
Century of Delinquency Research and Delinquency Theory, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 179, 186 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et. al. eds., 2002).
'0 The media is also partly responsible for the public's errant perception of runaway ju-
venile crime. Between 1993 and 1996, there was a 20% decline in homicides in America.
During that same period of time, however, there was a 721% increase in the number of
homicides reported on the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news. Less than one-half of one
percent of America's kids were arrested for a violent offense in 1996. Yet two-thirds of the
times children are depicted on the evening news, it is in connection with violence. VINCENT
SCHIRALDI & JASON ZIEDENBERG, RUNAWAY JUVENILE CRIME?: THE CONTEXT OF JUVENILE
ARRESTS tN AMERICA, JUST. POL'Y INST. 1-8 (1998).
11 Morning Edition, (National Public Radio broadcast, June 25, 1996).
12 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BETRAYING THE YOUNG: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE U.S, JUSTICE SYSTEM (1998).
13 A December 1998 Peter D. Hart & Associates Public Opinion Survey, commissioned
by the Children's Court Centennial Committee in connection with Cook County's com-
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In this essay, we seek to dispel the myth that the juvenile court
was never intended to deal with serious and violent offenders; a myth
that has largely been unchallenged, especially in the mainstream me-
dia, and one that critics of the juvenile court have used to undermine
its legitimacy. The discovery of homicide data from the Chicago po-
lice department from the early twentieth century, the era in which
modem juvenile justice came of age, provides us with new historical
data with which to put this dangerous myth to rest, by showing that
the nation's model juvenile court-the Cook County Juvenile
Court-did hear many cases of juvenile homicide. In addition, the
database has helped us to reconstruct important parts of the overall
legal response to juvenile homicide in this period. We have discov-
ered that the early twentieth century legal response to juvenile homi-
cide was far more flexible than today's approach, and that there were
more institutional checks in the system to protect children from
overly aggressive prosecution of their cases in the criminal justice
system.
The essay first provides a brief overview of the foundational phi-
losophy of the juvenile court movement, and addresses the question
of whether the juvenile court actually heard cases of serious and vio-
lent offenders in the early twentieth century. It then analyzes two
cases to highlight the influential role that the coroner's jury and the
grand jury played in the handling of juvenile homicide cases. The
historical section of the essay concludes with an examination of the
emerging battles waged between the state's attorney and the juvenile
court over jurisdiction in the 1920's and 1930's, which culminated in
the Illinois Supreme Court legitimizing a system of concurrent juris-
diction that had been developing informally since the beginning of
the century. Under this system of concurrent jurisdiction, which re-
memoration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the juvenile court, revealed that the
public had little confidence in the ability of the juvenile court to impact positively on the
lives of the children and families it serves. When asked "How much confidence do you have
in the ability of the juvenile court's efforts to help children and families at risk?," only 6 %
of the 1059 youth and adults surveyed said "a great deal of confidence;" 11% responded
"quite a bit of confidence," 48% said "just some confidence," 28% said "very little confi-
dence," and 2% said "no confidence at all." Peter D. Hart & Associates, Research/Public
Opinion Strategies, Study #5230b Dec. 15, 1998 (on file with authors). Interestingly, the
public's lack of confidence in the court apparently does not mean that it thinks that the an-
swer is to give up on youthful offenders. In fact, just the opposite is true-63% believed
that "all youths are capable of recovery and redemption, because children are young and
constantly changing, so we should not give up even on those who have committed violent
crimes," while only 27% said "it was too late to rehabilitate some youths who are more dan-
gerous or multiple offenders, and the best solution is prison, since punishment is the only
way to send a message." Id. at 15.
[Vol. 92
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mained in place until the mid-1960's, either the juvenile or criminal
courts could hear the cases of juveniles who were accused of serious
and violent offenses, including manslaughter and murder. The con-
temporary section of the essay, which focuses on current responses to
juvenile homicide, compares today's approach with past practices,
and spotlights the central role that prosecutors now play in determin-
ing how juvenile cases should be handled. After contrasting three re-
cent cases with the ones discussed from the early twentieth century,
the essay ends with an analysis of what engaging the past can teach
us about living in the present, and what lessons this exercise offers
for future juvenile justice policymaking.
PART I. THE FLEXIBLE LEGAL RESPONSE TO JUVENILE HOMICIDE IN
THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
A. DID THE JUVENILE COURT HEAR CASES OF SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE
OFFENDERS?
Before the creation of the juvenile court in 1899, the state prose-
cuted children's cases in a similar fashion to adult cases, although
some differences had emerged over the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Scholars of juvenile justice have pointed out that antebellum re-
formers through the construction of houses of refuge, which were
often nothing more "than a mini-prison for children," introduced
many of the legal innovations that progressive reformers would draw
upon to build the juvenile court.14 These innovations, as the law pro-
fessor Barry Feld has summarized, included "a formal age-based dis-
tinction between juvenile and adult offenders and their institutional
separation, the use of indeterminate commitments, and a broadened
legal authority that encompassed both criminal offenders and ne-
glected and incorrigible children."'" The leaders of the juvenile court
movement, though often critical of the institutionalization of children,
did credit these earlier reformers for at least firmly establishing the
principle that the state had a responsibility toward its children (parens
patriae) and its corollary that youthful offenders should be housed
separately from adult criminals.
14 Steven L. Schlossman, Delinquent Children: The Juvenile Reform School, in THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 334
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
15 BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
51(1999).
2002]
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The juvenile court movement, which began in the 1890's in Illi-
nois and spread both nationally and internationally, lobbied for the
creation of specialized courts to hear the cases of all children, includ-
ing adolescents, because they were understood to be qualitatively dif-
ferent from adults. 6 Led by the visionary philanthropist Lucy Flower
and the progressive reformer Julia Lathrop, the moral crusaders for
the juvenile court campaigned for the establishment of a juvenile law
that would allow judges the discretion necessary to apply individual-
ized treatments in order to rehabilitate children, instead of punishing
them. 7 As Judge Richard S. Tuthill, who presided over the nation's
first juvenile court, which opened in Cook County, Illinois in July,
1899, declared: "the basic principle of the [juvenile court] law is this:
That no child under 16 years of age shall be considered or be treated
as a criminal; that a child under that age shall not be arrested, in-
dicted, convicted, imprisoned, or punished as a criminal."'8 Signifi-
cantly, he added:
It of course recognizes the fact that such children may do acts which in
an older person would be crimes and be properly punishable by the State
therefore, but it provides that a child under the age mentioned shall not
be branded in the opening years of its life with an indelible stain of
criminality, or be brought, even temporarily, into the companionship of
men and women whose lives are low, vicious, and criminal.' 9
Thus, in principle, the juvenile court was designed to hear all the
cases of juvenile offenders.
In addition, a 1905 revision of Illinois' juvenile law gave the
court original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of "any male
16 Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083, 1094 (1991); FELD, supra
note 15, at 46.
17 David S. Tanenhaus, Justicefor the Child: The Beginning of the Juvenile Court in Chi-
cago, 27 CHI. HIST. 4-19 (1998-99) [hereinafter Tanenhaus, Justice for the Child]; David S.
Tanenhaus, Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction: The Evolution of Juvenile Courts
in the Early Twentieth Century, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 42[hereinafter Tanenhaus, Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction]. Zimring has recently
argued that the juvenile court was designed primarily to divert children from the criminal
justice system, and that its goal of intervening in the lives of children and their families has
been overstated. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread-Diversion in the Jurispru-
dence ofJuvenile Courts, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 142, 155.
18 Richard S. Tuthill, History of the Children's Court in Chicago, in CHILDREN'S COURTS
IN THE UNITED STATES: THEIR ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND RESULTS I (Samuel J. Barrows
ed. 1904).
'9 Id. at 1-2.
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child under 17 years or any female child under the age of 18 years. 20
This revised law, which raised the court's jurisdictional upper age
limit from sixteen years, included no offense-related exceptions to
the general principle that children's cases should be heard in the ju-
venile court. Thus, in principle and under Illinois law, the juvenile
court had jurisdiction over the cases of serious and violent offend-
ers.
21
In the early twentieth century, however, the city's juvenile court
judges did not assert their original and exclusive jurisdiction in every
case. Due to lingering concerns about the constitutionality of the
state's juvenile law, juvenile court judges did not want to give the Il-
linois Supreme Court an opportunity to declare that the law was un-
constitutional. 22  Instead, they entered into a "gentleman's
agreement" with the state's attorney that allowed the court to hear
most of the cases of serious and violent offenders, but also gave the
state's attorney the opportunity to prosecute some cases in the crimi-
nal justice system. Under this informal system of concurrent jurisdic-
tion, the state's attorney could potentially prosecute any child over
the state's age of criminal responsibility, which was set at ten years.23
The juvenile court also opted not to exercise its jurisdictional
claims in the cases of older children who committed serious crimes
while on probation, even though the court could retain jurisdiction
over juveniles in the system until they turned twenty-one. Thus,
judges, by not fighting to keep the cases of all children in the juvenile
justice system, were using a form of "passive transfer," in which, by
doing nothing, the court allowed for a child to be tried as an adult.24
The juvenile court did also actively transfer a few cases each
year to the criminal court, though much less than one percent of its
calendar. Between the years 1915 to 1919, for example, the court
20 ILLINOIS STATE JOURNAL, LAWS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 153 (1905).
21 HELEN JETER, THE CHICAGO JUVENILE COURT, 14-15 (1922).
22 In Lindsay v. Lindsay, 100 N.E. 892 (Ill. 1913), the Illinois Supreme Court sustained
the state's juvenile court law, but the jurisdictional conflict between the juvenile and crimi-
nal courts would not be resolved until 1935. See People v. Lattimore, 199 N.E. 275 (II.
1935).
23 David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer out of the Juvenile Court, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 13-43 [hereinafter Tanenhaus,
The Evolution of Transfer]. Grace E. Benjamin used the term "a gentleman's agreement" to
describe this practice. Grace E. Benjamin, The Case for the Juvenile Court: Social Aspects
ofa Simple Legal Problem, 16 CHI. BAR REC. 233 (1935).
24 Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer, supra note 23, at 21.
2002]
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only transferred 70 out of 11,799 cases, or 0.6 %.2" As Judge Merritt
Pinckney explained,
a child, a boy especially sometimes becomes so thoroughly vicious and
is so repeatedly an offender that it would not be fair to the other children
in a delinquent institution who have not arrived at his age of depravity
and delinquency to have to associate with him. On very rare and special
occasions, therefore, children are held over on a mittimus to the criminal
court.
2 6
Almost all of these cases involved boys who were recidivists and at
least sixteen years of age, and the few cases of first offenders were
those of boys close to seventeen years of age, whose crimes "in-
cluded daring holdups, carrying guns, thefts of considerable amounts
and rape.
' 27
By the early 1920's, it appears that a local culture of transfer had
developed in Chicago, in which judges acquiesced in the informal
system of concurrent jurisdiction and explained their decision to ac-
tively transfer some cases as a means of protecting younger children
housed in reform schools. The "gentleman's agreement" and the ac-
tive transferring of cases led to some juvenile offenders being tried as
adults in the criminal justice system.
Although the juvenile court did not hear every single case of a
juvenile accused of a serious and violent offense in the early twenti-
eth century, the court did hear the vast majority, including cases of
juvenile homicide. Using the Chicago Homicide Database, we have
located twenty-four cases from the early twentieth century, in which
either the coroner's jury or the police referred a homicide case to the
juvenile court. Once we factor in that juvenile homicides often in-
volved more than one defendant, it becomes clear that the juvenile
court on average heard more than one case of juvenile homicide per
year in this period (1906-1930).8 Although this total number is rela-
25 JETER, supra note 21, at 89.
26 SOPHONISBA P. BRECKENRIDGE & EDITH ABBOTT, THE DELINQUENT CHILD AND THE
HOME 208-209 (1912).
27 JETER, supra note 21, at 89.
28 The fact that it took six years before any cases of juvenile homicide were referred to
the juvenile court suggests that it took awhile for other institutions, such as the coroner's jury
and the police, to consider the juvenile court as the appropriate place to refer these cases.
Also since the defendant's age is not always listed in the police ledger and the outcome of
cases was not always recorded, the following are most likely only a subset of all the cases ofjuvenile homicide that were referred to juvenile court. In chronological order, the case num-
bers are: 254, 638, 2215, 2714, 3627, 4994, 3956, 3800, 5492, 3033, 3131, 3532, 6503,
6828, 6494, 7889, 7762, 8203, 9156, 9050, 9168, 8337, 8717, 10,483. See Leigh Bienen,
[Vol. 92
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tively small, it does reveal that the juvenile court was created at a
time when kids were not only throwing spitballs and knocking over
outhouses, but they were also killing people.29
Even more significant, however, than the fact that the juvenile
court did hear cases of juvenile homicide in the early twentieth cen-
tury, is how flexible in this period the overall legal response to juve-
nile homicide was. The next two sections of this essay, through close
examination of specific cases, reveal the important roles played by
the coroner's jury and, to a lesser extent, the grand jury in restraining
the prosecution of juveniles in the criminal justice system. The coro-
ner's jury, as we will demonstrate, kept many children out of both the
juvenile as well as the criminal justice systems. The final section ex-
plores the beginnings of the breakdown of this flexible system of re-
sponding to juvenile homicide, which witnessed the fraying of the
gentleman's agreement, the legalizing of concurrent jurisdiction, and
the manufacturing of the myth that the juvenile court was never in-
tended to hear the cases of serious and violent offenders.
B. THE CASE OF MARY RADEK AND THE ROLE OF THE CORONER'S JURY
On September 1, 1910, Mary Radek, an eight-year-old Bohe-
mian girl who had been rushed by ambulance to the Cook County
Hospital the day before, died from a ruptured appendix and peritoni-
tis. Although the coroner's physician, Henry Reinhart, initially re-
ported that a blow from a baseball thrown by an older girl had fatally
injured Mary, a week later stories about the case of Mary Radek ap-
peared in the city's newspapers. The Daily News reported, "to-day
rumors began to circulate about the manner of her death and, if
Chicago Homicide Project, Homicide Cases 1870-1930, Book One (2000) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Chicago Homicide Database].29 According to Eric Monkkonen's calculations, in New York City the rate of juvenile
homicide as a percentage of all homicides was actually higher in the nineteenth century than
in the late twentieth century. He states:
About 9.7% of the killers in early New York City were younger than eighteen. If we set
our definition of youth a bit lower, the historical comparison changes: 5% of the murderers
in nineteenth-century New York City were younger than sixteen, contrasted with only 3%
of those in late-twentieth-century New York City.
See ERIC MONKKONEN, MURDER IN NEW YORK CITY 82 (2001). Unfortunately, Monkkonen
allows the "superpredator" thesis to influence his comparisons of the past and present, and
argues, "the late-twentieth-century phenomenon of callous, very young murderers stands
apart from the nineteenth century, even though the nineteenth century had high numbers of
young murderers." Id. at 84. Given the evidence he presents about juvenile homicide in the
past, it is not clear why he draws this conclusion about today's kids.
2002]
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statements made in a daily Bohemian publication are correct, the lit-
tle girl died as the result of a brutal beating and kicking administered
by an older girl and not, as has been stated, because she was hit by a
baseball."3 The coroner had scheduled an inquest hearing for the
day after the girl's death, but no one appeared, and the hearing was
then rescheduled for the following week. On Monday, September 9,
a coroner's jury was summoned; the six-man jury heard testimony
from four witnesses and then rendered their verdict about the cause
and circumstances of Mary Radek's death.
Before examining the verdict in this specific case, we need to re-
construct the role of coroner's juries in homicide investigations, since
these juries often determined whether juvenile cases should be prose-
cuted, and, if so, which court system-the juvenile or criminal-
should hear them. The coroner's jury was an ancient institution
whose roots dated back to medieval England, and in Chicago these
juries continued to wield a great deal of influence through at least the
1920's." Under Illinois law,
every Coroner, whenever and as soon as he knows or is informed that the
dead body of any person is found or lying within his county, supposed to
have come to his or her death by violence, casualty, or any undue means,
he shall repair to the place where the dead body is and take charge of the
same and forthwith summon a jury of six good and lawful men of the
neighborhood where the body is found or lying, to assemble at the place
where the body is, at such time as he shall direct, and upon view of the
body inquire into the cause and manner of the death.3 2
30 Girl Beaten to Death, Report, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 1910, at 2.
31 The best accounts of the operations of the coroner's jury in Chicago date back to the
early twentieth century. See CHICAGO BUREAU OF PUBLIC EFFICIENCY ADMINISTRATION OF
THE OFFICE OF CORONER OF COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS (1911); ILLINOIS ASS'N FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY 357-376 (John H. Wigmore, ed. 1929). Other useful
accounts include ELIZABETH DALE, THE RULE OF JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE OF CHICAGO VERSUS
ZEPHYR DAVIS (2001); United States Life Ins. Co. v. Vocke, 129 I11. 557 (1889). On the
workings of coroner's juries in Illinois in the early 1970's see Richard P. Fahey & Deborah
J. Palmer, An Inquest on the Cook County Coroner (1971) (unpublished manuscript, on file
at the D'Angelo Law Library, University of Chicago). For an introduction to the role of the
coroner's jury in English law, see generally THOMAs ANDREW GREN, VERDICT ACCORDING
TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800 (1985).
For accounts of coroner's juries in the United States, see generally ROGER LANE, MURDER IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY (1997); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS
OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY (1981); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993).
32 Quoted in CHICAGO BUREAU OF PUBLIC EFFICIENCY ADMINISTRATION OF THE OFFICE OF
CORONER OF COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS, supra note 31, at 18.
[Vol. 92
HeinOnline -- 92 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 650 2001-2002
JUVENILE HOMICIDE
In the Progressive Era (1890-1920), a time when experts were
demanding a larger role in the administration of urban governance,
reformers criticized the political nature of the coroner's office as well
as the role of coroner's juries.33 A number of states replaced the of-
fice of the coroner, who was often an elected official, with a medical
examiner, who was required to be a trained and licensed physician.34
In Illinois, however, the coroner's office remained an elected office,
and coroner's juries continued to be summoned to issue verdicts in
cases of suspicious deaths.35
The political nature of the office also cast a long shadow over
how coroner's juries were selected, and how inquest hearings were
conducted. In 1911, in a report prepared for the judges of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, the Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency
stated that "one of the worst abuses in connection with the Coroner's
office is the 'professional' jury system," and noted that "in practically
all of the inquests held at the county morgue, numbering more than
1000 annually, 'professionals' constitute the juries. There are four-
teen 'professional' jurors who do the jury service on all but a very
small percentage of cases. Seven of the fourteen have served on ju-
ries at the morgue continuously since 1907 and some of the seven
even longer."36 Progressive reformers also documented the corrup-
tion and graft in this system. As it turned out, jurors who were sup-
posedly paid one dollar per hearing had to pay a fee in order to be
selected for jury duty.3 7 They would pay a deputy coroner, who con-
ducted inquests and choose jury members, fifty cents per hearing.3"
This combination of 'professional' jurors and graft raised questions
about the entire process.
In theory, coroner's juries should not have had much influence in
the handling of juvenile homicide cases because their verdicts, which
were supposedly limited to ascertaining the cause of death, were only
advisory and did not legally bind the police, the state's attorney, or
13 For classic studies on progressivism, see generally, RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR (1955); SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM,
1885-1914 (1957); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967).
34 FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 31, at 208-209; LANE, supra note 31, at 201.
35 The office of the coroner was written into the Illinois Constitution of 1870 and was not
abolished until very late in the twentieth century. Fahey and Palmer describe the operations
of the coroner's office and coroner's juries in 1969 and 1970. Fahey & Palmer, supra note
31.
36 CHICAGO BUREAU OF PUBLIC EFFICIENCY ADMINISTRATION OF THE OFFICE OF CORONER
OF COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS, supra note 31, at 7.
31 Id. at 9.
38 id.
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the grand jury.39 Accordingly, even if a coroner's jury exonerated an
accused person, the police could still hold a prisoner in jail, the
state's attorney could still seek an indictment, and a grand jury could
still return a true bill.
In practice, however, the coroner's jury had a great deal of influ-
ence in deciding homicide cases. In the famous Illinois Crime Survey
of 1929, Arthur Lashly lamented that coroner's juries often exceeded
their statutory power. He noted:
The jury invariably includes in the verdict not only the cause of death,
but undertakes also to determine, in the first instance, the question of
whether a crime was committed, the character of the crime and who
committed it, if the killer is known, and will often order the release of
persons in custody charged with the killing, on the ground that the killing
was justifiable or that there was no evidence to hold the accused. This is
an assumption of the prerogatives of the police and prosecutor which
would not be nearly so significant were it not for the fact that the police
and prosecutor in criminal cases are inclined to accept the coroner's ver-
dict as final, not only with respect to the cause of death, but also as to
whether due to felonious, accidental, or excusable homicide.
40
Thus, if the coroner's jury exonerated the accused, this verdict most
likely meant that the state's attorney would not prosecute the case.
Perhaps even more surprising was the fact that the state's attor-
ney rarely participated in inquest hearings. As Lashly pointed out,
the police were responsible for gathering and presenting evidence at
these hearings, but "[t]he state's attorney's office in the average run
of cases, has no representative at the inquest. Occasionally, in a case
of great public interest, an assistant state's attorney is present. Such
occasions are rare."'" He added:
It is submitted that this is most unfortunate for the state. The adverse in-
terest is practically always represented, and although the deputy coroner
does most of the questioning and the proceedings are informal, and
cross-examination of witnesses is not permitted, counsel for the accused
is allowed, upon request, to question witnesses, and it often occurs that
by artful leading questions a witness is put on record about the facts in a
murder case in a light he never intended. When later at the trial in the
criminal court he is confronted with the cold record of his answers to
these questions at the coroner's inquest, the witness may be so effec-
tively impeached, however unjustly, as to seriously impair the prosecu-
tion. If the state's attorney were present these very common occurrences
39 Arthur V. Lashly, Homicide, in THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra note 31, at 596.
40 id.
41 Id. at 598.
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might be wholly avoided. Indeed, it is hard to square efficient admini-
stration of V2rosecution in homicide cases with the practice of ignoring
the inquest.
Explaining the absence of a representative of the state's attorney at
most inquest hearings is beyond the scope of this essay, but the lack
of a prosecutor at these hearings certainly enhanced the power of the
coroner's jury to serve as check against trying juveniles in the crimi-
nal justice system.
With regards to cases of juvenile homicide from 1900 to 1930,
we located more than sixty cases in which a coroner's jury exoner-
ated either a single accused or multiple juvenile defendants. 3 The
vast majority of these cases (fifty-two, or eighty-three percent) in-
volved either a child or adolescent shooting somebody "acciden-
tally," most often a friend or family member." The frequency of
gun-related deaths involving minors in the early twentieth century
prompted children's activists, such as Jane Addams, to speak out
against the easy availability of guns. As Addams wrote in The Spirit
of Youth and the City Streets, "there is an entire series of difficulties
directly traceable to the foolish and adventurous persistence of carry-
ing loaded firearms," and after reprinting a newspaper article about a
42 Id. at 598-599.
43 This figure includes cases listed in the police ledgers as being seventeen years of age or
younger at the time of the homicide. Unfortunately, the age of the defendant was not always
listed. Thus, the following sixty-two cases, which are in chronological order, are probably
only a subset of all juvenile cases that were exonerated by coroner's juries. See Chicago
Homicide Database, supra note 28, Case Nos. 737, 1073, 1380, 2342, 2346, 652, 2399,
3977, 4319, 6712, 6512, 5694, 7183, 6419, 5853, 6525, 6757, 5635, 7021,5870, 6095, 6363,
6790, 6109, 6021, 6210, 6491,5945, 5838, 8857, 8961,8547, 8070, 9013, 8195, 8205, 7915,
8580, 8594, 8707, 9368, 8710, 9168 (turned over to Juvenile Authorities), 8494, 9173, 7834
(turned over to Juvenile Authorities), 9323, 8260, 8939, 7862, 10,864, 10,415, 11,158,
10,876, 10,104, 10,998, 9523, 10,901, 9566, 10,173, 10,052, 10,853. Note that two juveniles
(Case Nos. 9168 and 7834) were exonerated, but also turned over to the juvenile court. One
of these cases involved a fifteen-year-old girl who killed her husband, and in the other case
the coroner's jury recommended that the boy be sent to the juvenile court in order to have
mental tests conducted.
44 See Chicago Homicide Database, supra note 28, Case Nos. 1380, 2342, 652, 3977,
6712, 6512, 5694, 7183, 6419, 5853, 6525, 6757, 5635, 5870, 6095, 6363, 6790, 6109, 6021,
6210, 6491, 5945, 5838, 8857, 8961, 8547, 8070, 9013, 8195, 7915, 8594, 8707, 9368, 8710,
8494, 9173, 7834, 9323, 8939, 7862, 10,864, 10,415, 11,158, 10,876, 10,104, 10,998, 9523,
10,901, 9566, 10,173, 10,052, and 10,853. In 1912, twelve-year-old Adlai Stevenson, Jr.,
the future Governor of Illinois and twice the nominee of the Democratic Party for the presi-
dency of the United States, accidentally shot and killed fifteen-year-old Ruth Merwin at a
Christmas Party in Bloomington, Illinois. A coroner's jury exonerated Stevenson. See
PORTER MCKEEVER, ADLAI STEVENSON: His LIFE AND LEGACY 30-31 (1989); Cleared of
Blame in Merwin Tragedy: Verdict Exonerated Adlai Stevenson, THE PANTAGRAPH, Jan. 1,
1913 at 1.
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boy being goaded into shooting another boy, she added, "this tale
could be duplicated almost every morning; what might be merely a
boyish scrap is turned into tragedy because some boy has a re-
volver."45 In verdicts, coroner's juries also often voiced their con-
cerns about the availability of guns. For example, in a case involving
a thirteen-year-old boy shooting his twelve-year-old friend, the jury
declared: "From the evidence offered the jury are inclined to the be-
lief that this is an accidental case ... and [also] recommend that the
police see to it that arrest and punishment under the law be meted out
to people selling fire arms and to all individuals carrying fire arms
unlawfully, also that the confiscation of said arms be made."46
The death of Mary Radek did not involve a handgun, but accord-
ing to the coroner's physician's initial report, her death appeared to
be another form of "accidental" juvenile homicide; in this case, death
by baseball.47 According to the report, a twelve-year-old girl had
thrown a baseball at Mary Radek, which hit her in the abdomen.4"
Although there are a couple of cases in the homicide database that in-
volved children being killed after being hit accidentally in the head
by baseball bats,49 it seems highly unlikely that a twelve-year-old
girl (or boy) could throw a ball hard enough to rupture another girl's
appendix. The circumstances surrounding Mary's death appeared
45 JANE ADDAMS, THE SPIRIT OF YOUTH AND THE CITY STREETS 60-61 (Univ. of Ill. Press
1972) (1909). She quoted the following article:
A party of boys, led by Daniel O'Brien, thirteen years old, had gathered in front of the house and
O'Brien was throwing stones at-Nieczgodzski in revenge for a whipping that he received at his
hands about a month ago. The Polish boy ordered them away and threatened to go into the house
and get a revolver if they did not stop. Pfister, one of the boys in O'Brien's party, called him a
coward, and when he pulled a revolver from his pocket, dared him to put it away and meet him in
a fist fight in the street. Instead of accepting the challenge, Nieczgodzki aimed his revolver at
Pfister and fired. The bullet crashed through the top of his head and entered the brain. He was
rushed to the Alexian Brothers' Hospital, but died a short time after being received there. Niec-
zgodski was arrested and held without bail.
Id. at 61. According to the Chicago Homicide Database, Nieczgodski was initially held over
by the coroner's jury, but later acquitted in court. See Chicago Homicide Database, supra
note 28, Case No. 1970.
46 Inquest No. 56,848, Upon the Body of Hyman Seltzer, County of Cook, State of Illi-
nois, on the 21 + 23 Day of Nov. 1910, Cook County Coroner's Inquest Records, 1871-1911
(available on microform at the Illinois Regional Archives Directory, Northeastern Illinois
University, Chicago, Illinois).
47 Inquest No. 55,849, Upon the Body of Mary Radek, County of Cook, State of Illinois,
on the 2nd + 9th Days of Sept. 1910, Cook County Coroner's Inquest Records, 1871-1911,
supra note 46.
48 id.
49 See Chicago Homicide Database, supra note 28, Case Nos. 8205 and 8580.
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suspicious, and people from her neighborhood began to speak out
about the case.
The newspaper descriptions of Mary's killer that appeared a
week after her death made it sound as if one of today's so-called
"superpredators" had been transported back in time. The Chicago
Daily Tribune reported that the killer was "[o]ne 14-year-old girl in
the neighborhood of Halsted and Fifteenth streets [who] is terrorizing
a whole Bohemian settlement, according to the assertions of resi-
dents."5 It added, "[t]he Bohemian residents of the neighborhood
put the blame of the girl's death upon an older girl of a different na-
tionality. They say they have appealed in vain for protection for their
children to the police of the Maxwell street station."5  The article
concluded with a terrifying description of the murder:
An older sister told of the death of the little girl. While she was playing
in a vacant lot at the corner of Halsted and Fifteenth streets late Thursday
afternoon, Aug. 30 with two other companions of the same age [8], they
claim the older girl attacked them. The other girls ran away, but the
Radek girl was unable to get away, and received blows on the head and
stomach. Little Marin, 722 West Fifteenth street, one of the companions
of the girl at the time of the attack, told the story last night. She said that
the older girl first hit them all on the head with a baseball which she car-
ried in her hand. Two of them ran away and when they turned around
they claim they saw the big girl hitting the Radek child in the stomach
with the ball in her hand. The mother of the accused girl denies that her
52daughter had anything to do with the death of Mary Radek.
It should be noted that this story, which a modem reader would as-
sume to be front-page news, ran on page three, and the accused girl's
name did not appear in the article. 3
The coroner's jury met the next day to determine the cause and
circumstances of Mary Radek's death, and to decide what should be
done with Verna Daly, the girl who had allegedly killed her.54 There
were only four witnesses at the inquest: Francis Radek, who was
listed as a housewife and was probably Mary's mother; Lillie Mar-
van, who appears to have been a neighbor; David W. Carroll, the po-
lice officer who investigated the case; and Henry Reinhardt, the
Coroner's Physician."5 It is unclear why the neighborhood children,




54 Inquest No. 55,849, supra note 47.
55id.
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who, supposedly witnessed the brutal beating, including Mary's older
sister, did not testify. In many other cases of juvenile homicide
which we examined from this era, children did testify at inquest hear-
ings.56
The verdict of the coroner's jury offered a mixed message: Verna
was responsible for Mary's death, but not entirely culpable for it.
The jury declared:
From the evidence offered the Jury are of the opinion the result of a blow
in the abdomen by a base ball, said thrown at the deceased with intent to
do bodily harm by one Verna Daly living #729 W. 15th Street, on Aug.
30 1910. [T]he happening taking place in an Empty lot immediately
across the street from the residence of the said Verna Daly. Owing to the
extreme youth of the accused Vema Daly the Jury recommend that she
be permitted to remain in the custody of her parents for the present [and]
until the case is taken up by the Juvenile Court to which the police are
requested to bring immediate notification.
57
Clearly, the jury did not think that this was a case of accidental homi-
cide, but at the same time they believed that the girl belonged in the
custody of her parents, not in jail, and that her case should be heard
by the juvenile court, not the criminal court. Unfortunately, there are
no extant juvenile court files from 1908, which makes it difficult, if
not impossible, to know what ultimately became of Verna Daly."
Given what we know about the juvenile court's handling of girl's
cases in this era, it is most likely that the court would have committed
Verna for her minority to the State Reformatory for Girls at 'Geneva.59
56 See, e.g., Inquest No. 46,990, Upon the Body of Joseph Donnersberger, County of
Cook, State of Illinois, on the 19th Day of Oct. 1908, Cook County Coroner's Inquest Re-
cords, 1871-1911; Inquest No. 56,848, Cook County Coroner's Inquest Records, 1871-
1911, supra note 46; Inquest No. 58,337, Upon the Body of Alexander Griggs, Cook
County, State of Illinois, on the 13th Day of Jan. 1911, Cook County Coroner's Records,
1871-1911.
57 Inquest No. 55,849, supra note 47.
58 There are approximately 2700 extant case files from the court's founding in 1899 until
1926, but it is not known why these select records were preserved. Every child who entered
the juvenile court system was assigned a permanent case number and all his or her subse-
quent legal papers were filed under this number. The case files are impounded and research-
ers must receive permission from the presiding Chief Judge of the Cook County Juvenile
Court to look at them. The records are held at the Cook County Circuit Court Archives,
Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois.
59 See generally, ANNE MEIs KNUPFER, REFORM AND RESISTANCE: GENDER,
DELINQUENCY, AND AMERICA'S FIRST JUVENILE COURT 79-98 (2001) (providing a compre-
hensive account of how in the early twentieth century the Cook County Juvenile Court han-
dled cases of girl delinquency).
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As this section has revealed, in the early twentieth century the
coroner's jury, through exonerations and referrals to juvenile court,
served as an institutional check that spared many children from being
tried as adults. The coroner's jury, however, was only the first check
in the flexible response system to juvenile homicide. Even if a coro-
ner's jury recommended that a case be prosecuted, the state's attor-
ney still had to convince the grand jury to issue a true bill. As we
shall see, the state's attorney often had a difficult time securing in-
dictments in cases of juvenile homicide, which may partially explain
why prosecutors allowed the juvenile court to hear cases of children
like Verna Daly.
C. THE JOSEPH DONNERSBERGER, JR. CASE AND THE ROLE OF THE GRAND JURY
I don't believe I'm going to live, mamma and I want you to let Frank
McCarthy know that I forgive him for what he did. I want to let Joe
McCarthy, too, know that I have no hard feelings against him. We all
used to go to school together and I believe they are sorry for what hap-
pened to me,
declared Joseph Donnersberger, Jr., age thirteen, on Saturday, Octo-
ber 17, 1908, shortly before he died.6° According to the Chicago
Daily News, "Frank McCarthy... who inflicted the mortal wound
with a paper cutter, sobbed bitterly at the juvenile court, where he is
being held."61 Frank's twin brother, Joseph, was also involved in the
stabbing, and the subsequent handling of the cases of these twelve-
year-old boys reveals how in the early twentieth century the grand
jury could act as a second institutional check against trying juveniles
as adults.62
All the press accounts led with the boy's forgiveness of his as-
sailants, and they also all emphasized that not only had the boys gone
to school together, but that their fathers, Anthony Donnersberger and
Frank McCarthy, had grown up together and been friends for more
than thirty years.63 Adding to the drama was the fact that the accused
boy's father was a police officer, to whom Joseph, as he lay dying in
60 Youth Forgives; Dies, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 17, 1908, at 3. The Chicago Daily Trib-
une and the Chicago Record-Herald printed nearly verbatim accounts of Joseph's state-
ments. See Injured Boy Dies Forgiving, Cm. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 18, 1908, at 3; Boy Forgives
and Dies, CHI. REC.-HERALD, Oct. 18, 1908, at 5.
61 hjured Boy Dies Forgiving, supra note 60.
62 Chicago Homicide Database, supra note 28, Case No. 638.
63 See Youth Forgives; Dies, supra note 60; Injured Boy Dies Forgiving, supra note 60;
Boy Forgives and Dies, supra note 60.
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the hospital, stated: "Have they sent you to take me home, Mr.
McCarthy? The doctors say I'm dying, and I don't think I'll ever go
home any more. I want you to tell Frank that I forgive him, and tell
Joe there is no hard feeling. I know they feel bad about me, and that
they are sorry I was hurt."64 Policeman McCarthy, according to all
accounts, after trying to console the boy's father, left the hospital in
tears.65
The reports of the stabbing were sketchy and contradictory. The
Chicago Record-Herald said, "ft]he scuffle which resulted in the
tragedy occurred when one of the McCarthys sought to take young
Donnersberger's pencil box from him, according to statements made
to the police. Frank McCarthy told the police that his brother was be-
ing worsted by the other boy and he went to his assistance and Don-
nerberger was stabbed., 66 Frank's brother Joseph told a different
story. He explained that bullies had been chasing the brothers,
and we weren't trying to fight, but to get away from them .... My
brother had the paper cutter in his hand-he was taking it home from
school .... Somebody caught him and swung him around, and his right
arm flew backwards. Joseph Donnersberger was standing near and the
blade of the paper cutter cut him.
67
As the Chicago Daily News informed its readers, a coroner's jury, to
be convened at the Donnersberger's home on October 19, would de-
termine what would happen to Frank McCarthy.
68
As it turned out, the inquest hearing led the coroner's jury to rec-
ommend that both Frank and Joseph McCarthy "be held to the Grand
Jury upon a charge of manslaughter until discharged by due course of
law," although they also suggested that both boys "be admitted to
bail."69 At the hearing, fourteen witnesses testified, including eleven
schoolboys from the neighborhood."0 Henry Reinhardt, the coroner's
physician, and the deceased boy's father and grandfather rounded out
the list of witnesses." It is unclear why this coroner's jury thought
that these boys should be tried as adults. There are a couple of possi-
64 Boy Forgives and Dies, supra note 60.
65 See Youth Forgives; Dies, supra note 60; Injured Boy Dies Forgiving, supra note 60;
Boy Forgives and Dies, supra note 60.
66 Boy Forgives and Dies, supra note 60.
67 Father is Unforgiving, Cf-n. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 19, 1908, at 14.
68 Id.
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ble explanations. One possibility is that the boy's grandfather Joseph
Donnerberger, "a prosperous real estate dealer and at one time presi-
dent of the South Park board," might have influenced the jury.12 A
second possibility has to do with the timing of this case; it appears
that coroner's juries did not start regularly referring cases to the juve-
nile court until the Fall of 1910, about the time of the Mary Radek
case. Thus, the McCarthy boys may have had a very different ex-
perience if their cases had occurred a couple of years later.
Even though the first institutional check in the legal system, the
coroner's jury, did not stop the McCarthy boys from being tried as
adults, other checks in the system-the grand jury and prosecutorial
discretion-prevented this from happening. On November 8, 1908,
the grand jury "no billed" Joseph, and two months later the State of-
ficially declined to prosecute Frank.73 Both boys were spared from
being tried and possibly convicted as adults, but the grand jury and
the prosecutor also set them free. In the juvenile justice system, these
boys would most likely have spent time in a reformatory, or at least
been placed on probation.
A more detailed analysis of the grand jury's role in juvenile
homicide cases needs to be written, but for our purposes in this essay
we would like to stress only that in the early twentieth century, grand
juries eliminated cases at a higher rate than today. According to a re-
port by E.W. Hinton published in the Illinois Crime Survey, the grand
jury in Cook County eliminated over thirty percent of all the felony
cases it heard.74 His research suggested that this rate of elimination
may have had a great deal to do with the state's attorney, "as the
state's attorney normally dominates the grand jury, and can obtain an
indictment if he wishes it on a very slight showing."75 This high rate
of eliminations suggests that either the state's attorney did not think
he had enough evidence to seek indictments aggressively in many
cases, or perhaps that the grand jury exercised more power than Hin-
ton attributed to it.
By the time that the Illinois Crime Survey was published in 1929,
the flexible system of responding to juvenile homicide was beginning
to break down, and the final section of this historical part of the essay
72 Boy Forgives and Dies, supra note 60.
7 Chicago Homicide Database, supra note 28, Case No. 638.
74 E.W. Hinton, The Trial Courts in Felony Cases, in THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra
note 3 1, at 204-5.
75 Id. at 206. See also Lashly, supra note 39, at 626 (noting that in murder cases, the
grand jury no billed 12.55% of those charged with murder during 1926 and 1927).
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briefly explores why it did, and what the consequences of this break-
down were for juveniles.
D. THE CASE OF MAJOR TUCKER AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE FLEXIBLE LEGAL
RESPONSE TO JUVENILE HOMICIDE
According to the police ledger, on August 4, 1926, Clifford Jack-
son, age sixteen, shot and killed Major Tucker, a forty-nine-year-old
African American man.76 Clifford, who had fired at some boys, hit
Tucker by mistake." Later that day, a coroner's jury held Clifford
responsible together "with Wm. Weatherby, age 15, Rudolph An-
drews, age 16, and Henry Stubbs, age 16, all colored, as accesso-
ries."" The Major Tucker case has many of the characteristics of late
twentieth century American youth violence: a group of adolescent
boys committed the offense, they were arrested as a group, and the
use of a gun in the incident led to someone dying.79 The fact that the
boys were African Americans also raises questions about the dispro-
portionate share of minorities in the American juvenile justice sys-
tem, which has been a concern since the beginning of the twentieth
century.80 The legal response to the Major Tucker case partly re-
flected the flexible early twentieth century response to juvenile homi-
cide that prevented most juveniles from being tried as adults, but it
76 Chicago Homicide Database, supra note 28, Case No. 9156.
77 id.
78 id.
79 See generally, ZIMRING, supra note 5, at 17-31 (providing a comprehensive profile of
American youth violence in the 1990's).
80 See generally, EARL R. MOSES, THE NEGRO DELINQUENT IN CHICAGO (1936). As
Moses calculated,
[i]n 1900 the Negro population of Chicago numbered 30,150, or 1.8 percent of the total popula-
tion. Of the 8,056 male delinquents brought before the Juvenile Court of Cook County (Illinois)
during the years 1900-1906, ten to seventeen years of age, 278 were Negroes, or 3.5 percent of the
total delinquents brought into court. The Negro population of Chicago in 1910 numbered 44,103,
or 2.0 percent of the total population. Negro male and female delinquents, however, had increased
to 102 or 6.2 percent of the total delinquents (1636) for that year. There were 8,141 male delin-
quents, ten to seventeen years of age, brought before the Juvenile Court of Cook County during the
years 1917-1923. Of that number 541 were Negroes, or 6.6 percent of the total male delinquents
brought into court. In the decade from 1910 to 1920 the Negro population had increased to
109,594 or 4.1 percent of the total population. In 1920 Negro male and female delinquents had in-
creased to 310, or 12.2 percent of the total delinquents (2550) for that year. By 1930 the Negro
population had increased to 233,903 or 6.9 percent of the total population. In the last decade Ne-
gro male and female delinquents had increased to 21.2 percent (657) of the total (3095) delin-
quents for the year. A comparison of the percent increase in the population with the percent




HeinOnline -- 92 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 660 2001-2002
JUVENILE HOMICIDE
also foreshadowed the trend toward prosecuting more juveniles as
adults.
The Major Tucker case revealed concurrent jurisdiction in action.
Although all the boys involved were charged with murder, Rudolph
Andrews and Henry Stubbs remained in the juvenile justice system,
while the other two, Clifford Jackson and William Weatherby, en-
tered the criminal justice system. On August 9, M.L. Kelly, whose
position was similar to a police probation officer, filed delinquency
petitions against Andrews and Stubbs, and the juvenile court declared
that each boy "was and is incorrigible," placed both in the Juvenile
Detention Home on West Harrison Street, in the custody of Joseph L.
Moss, the Chief Probation Officer, and finally appointed an attorney,
Marie Anderson, to represent each boy.8 On February 9, 1927,
Judge Victor Arnold continued the Andrews case, and ordered that
Stubbs be placed on probation.8 2  There is no further information
about Andrews in his juvenile court file, which means that he proba-
bly did not appear before the court again. In early October, Judge
Mary Bartelme permanently discharged Henry Stubbs, almost eight
months to the day on which he had been placed on probation.83
Meanwhile, the state's attorney charged Clifford Jackson with
murder, and also sought to have William Weatherby indicted, pre-
sumably for murder.84 In September, however, the grand jury no
billed Weatherby.85 Jackson was indicted the next month, but then
"by agreement," presumably with the state's attorney's office, his
case was transferred by the trial court to the juvenile court.8 6 Unfor-
tunately, Clifford Jackson's juvenile court file no longer exists, and it
is impossible to discover what happened to him. Thus, all of the ju-
81 The information in this paragraph comes from the boys' juvenile court files. See Juve-
nile Record #10,326, In the Matter of Rudolph Andrews, August 9, 1926, Cook County Cir-
cuit Court Archives, supra note 58; Juvenile Record #103,270, In the Matter of Henry
Stubbs, August 9, 1926, Cook County Circuit Court Archives, supra note 58.
82 Juvenile Record #10,326, Cook County Circuit Court Archives, supra note 58; Juve-
nile Record #103,270, Cook County Circuit Court Archives, supra note 58.
83 Juvenile Record #10,326, Cook County Circuit Court Archives, supra note 58; Juve-
nile Record #103,270, Cook County Circuit Court Archives, supra note 58.
84 Chicago Homicide Database, supra note 28, Case No. 9156.
85 Id.
86 Indictment No. 41232, The People of the State of Illinois Versus Clifford Jackson, Ru-
dolph Andrews and Henry Stubbs (Sept. 27, 1926). Although Andrews and Stubbs are listed
in the indictment, the juvenile court had already found them delinquent. The page from the
docket book, which included the information about this case, is available at the Cook County
Circuit Court Archives, supra note 58. According to Lashly, trial courts certified six cases
of murders to the juvenile court in 1926 and 1927, including five cases of "colored males."
Lashly, supra note 39, at 627.
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veniles involved in the death of Major Tucker had very different ex-
periences in the legal system. Andrews had his case continued by the
juvenile court; Stubbs spent eight months on juvenile probation;
Weatherby walked; and Jackson, the shooter, although indicted, was
transferred to juvenile court. The case of Major Tucker reveals a
wide range of possible outcomes in a case of juvenile homicide from
the mid-1 920's, none of which involved the juvenile being tried as an
adult.
Yet, the mid-1920's were also a turning point in the handling of
the cases of serious and violent offenders, as the state's attorney be-
gan prosecuting more juveniles as adults. This more aggressive
prosecution of juveniles as adults set the stage for the Illinois Su-
preme Court to hear a series of cases to determine which court sys-
tem-the juvenile or criminal-had jurisdiction over these cases of
serious and violent offenders.87 Ultimately, the Illinois high court le-
galized concurrent jurisdiction, granted the state's attorney the power
to determine whether a child would be brought to juvenile or criminal
court, and also stripped the juvenile court of its exclusive jurisdiction
over children already in the juvenile justice system.8
Before concluding this historical section of the essay it is worth
examining the rhetorical path to the legalization of concurrent juris-
diction, since along its way the critics of the juvenile court created
the myth that the juvenile court was never intended to hear the cases
of juvenile felons. The Illinois Supreme Court drew upon this lan-
guage to declare in the Lattimore case,
[i]t was not intended by the legislature that the juvenile court should be
made a haven of refuge where a delinquent child of the age recognized
by the law as capable of committing a crime should be immune from
punishment for violation of the criminal laws of the state committed by
such child subsequent to his or her being declared a delinquent child.8 9
87 See People v. Fitzgerald, 152 N.E. 542 (I1. 1926); People v. Bruno, 179 N.E. 129 (11.
1931); People v. Lattimore, 199 N.E. 275 (Il1. 1935). In this period, many state legislatures
were raising the maximum age jurisdiction of their juvenile courts, and also beginning to ex-
clude some serious offenses, generally murder and other crimes punishable by death or life
imprisonment. See Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer, supra note 23, at 25.
88 See Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer, supra note 23, at 27-28 (discussing these
cases).
89 Lattimore, 199 N.E. at 276. In the same year, the Court of Errors and Appeals of New
Jersey used much the same language about the juvenile court's mission, when it stated that
"[ilt is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to make the juvenile court a sanctuary for
juvenile felons." Exparte Danlecki, 177 A. 91,92 (N.J. Ch. 1935).
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In the same year, Chief Justice Denis E. Sullivan of the Criminal
Court used similar arguments in his campaign for an amendment to
the states' juvenile law that would strip the juvenile court of jurisdic-
tion over cases involving felonies.9" Chief Justice Sullivan declared
that the legal system was soft on crime, due to the fact that "[t]he
out-dated Juvenile Court Act permits highly dangerous gunmen and
thieves, or even murderers, to be accorded leniency intended only for
bad boys or bad girls who have committed no serious crime and who
are not habitual offenders."'" If this amendment had passed, the
criminal court would have had sole jurisdiction over the cases of any
boy or girl over ten years of age, accused of committing a felony.
Thus, by the mid-1930's critics of the juvenile court were already
calling it "outdated" and manufacturing the myth that the juvenile
court was never intended to handle the cases of "today's" serious and
violent offenders.
At the same time that this myth was being bandied about, de-
fenders of the juvenile court countered this charge with the argument
that historically the juvenile court, by transferring dangerous juve-
niles to the criminal court, had protected the public's safety and that
judges would continue to do so. As the nation was mired in the Great
Depression, critics as well as defenders of the juvenile court had
reached a consensus that there was a class of juveniles who should be
tried as adults.92 Yet, the participants in these debates vehemently
disagreed over how large that class was, and whether the juvenile
court or the state's attorney should determine which young people be-
longed to it. That debate continued over the course of the twentieth
century, and has now entered the new millennium.
The flexible legal response to juvenile homicide, which de-
pended upon a series of institutional checks against the aggressive
prosecution of juveniles as adults, had begun to break down in the
mid-1920's. Although more research needs to be done on the spe-
cific parts of this system, such as when exactly the influence of coro-
ner's juries declined, the decision by the state's attorney to disregard
90 See Frank H. Bicek, The Juvenile Court, 16 CH. BAR REC. 221, 221 (1935); Women
Protest Juvenile Cases in Criminal Court, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 18, 1935, at 23.
91 L. Mara Dodge, Our Juvenile Court Has Become More Like a Criminal Court.A Cen-
tury of Reform at the Cook County (Chicago) Juvenile Court, 26 MICH. HIST. REV. 51, 60
(2000).
92 See Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer, supra note 23, at 26-29. There were some
defenders of the juvenile court, such as Judge Joseph Siegler of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Essex County, New Jersey, who argued that no juvenile should ever be
tried as an adult. Id. at 29.
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the unwritten gentlemen's agreement in order to prosecute more ju-
veniles offenders as adults foreshadowed late twentieth century
trends. The second half of this essay examines these contemporary
practices.
PART II. THE RIGID RESPONSE TO JUVENILE HOMICIDE IN THE LATETWENTIETH CENTURY
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW TRANSFER REGIME
In the 1990's, in response to an alarming increase in juvenile vio-
lence, many states enacted tough transfer laws.93 As the quotations
from prosecutors at the beginning of this essay revealed, the myth
that the juvenile court was never intended to deal with violent of-
fenders became a common rallying cry of critics of the court. These
cries grew to a fever pitch with the birth of the "superpredator" myth
in late 1995. Using the sound bite "adult time for adult crime" as
their mantra, critics of the court pushed for laws to make it easier to
prosecute juveniles as adults. 94 Their successful efforts produced a
93 In the decade from 1984 to 1994, the number of murders committed by youth tripled
from 823 to 2320. The overall serious violent crime rate (including homicide, rape, robbery
and aggravated assault) among youths aged twelve to seventeen also soared-from twenty-
nine offenses per 1000 youth in 1986 to fifty-two in 1993. RICHARD A. MENDEL, AM.
YOUTH POLICY FORUM, LESS HYPE, MORE HELP: REDUCING JUVENILE CRIME, WHAT WORKS
-AND WHAT DOESN'T 30-31 (2000). As Frank Zimring has demonstrated,
[t]he most important reason for the sharp escalation in homicide [among offenders thirteen to sev-
enteen] was an escalating volume of fatal attacks with firearms .... That homicide increases are
only gun cases has two important implications. First, it would require only a small number of at-
tacks to change the death statistics dunng the 1985-1992 period. Because gunshot wounds are
deadly, a relatively small number of woundings can produce a relatively large number of kill-
ings .... The second implication of the guns-only pattern is that the hardware used in many at-
tacks seems to be the major explanation for the expanding rate rather than any basic change in the
youth population involved in the assaults.
ZIMRING, supra note 5, at 35-36. The best introduction to theory and practice of transfer is
THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT, supra note 6. For a history of the statutory exclusion of specific offenses, including
murder, see generally Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE:
TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 6, at 83-144.
94 MENDEL, supra note 93, at 30-31. It's hard to pinpoint who coined the phrase "adult
time for adult crimes" but the phrase clearly permeated the political scene in the mid-1990's.
In fact, virtually every major Republican gubernatorial candidate in the mid-1990's jumped
on this bandwagon, including: Governor George Allen of Virginia, Governor Tom Ridge of
Pennsylvania, Governor George Pataki of New York, Governor Pete Wilson of California,
Governor William F. Weld of Massachusetts, and Governor John Engler of Michigan. See
Laurence Hammack, Compassion May Be Lost; Gov. Allen Accepts Report that Proposes
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legal response to serious and violent juvenile crime which flushed
pre-teens, first-time offenders, and even non-violent offenders into
an adult criminal court system that had all but abandoned the concept
of rehabilitation. As a result of harsh mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing policies, the abolition of parole, and "truth-in-sentencing laws"
which required convicted defendants to serve most or all of their
prison terms, criminal court judges could no longer use youthfulness
to mitigate sentences. Juveniles convicted in adult court were all but
assured of receiving "adult time" for their crimes. In fact, juvenile
transfers convicted of murder received longer sentences on average
than their adult counterparts.95 Under this rigid legal response sys-
tem, the extreme youth of an offender could lead to an extreme sen-
tence, in which a pre-teen could spend the rest of his or her life
incarcerated for a crime committed before he or she had even reached
puberty. By the mid-1990's, youth had ceased to be a mitigating fac-
tor in adult court, and instead had become a liability.96
The new transfer laws differed from past practices. Historically,
transfers had been reserved for older teens who were recidivists or
who had committed especially heinous crimes. Since the United
States Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Kent v. United States, judi-
cial waiver had been the most common approach to transferring juve-
niles to the criminal court.9 7 The Kent decision enumerated a list of
substantive factors to guide judges in making transfer decisions, and
many states simply adopted these standards in their juvenile codes
verbatim or with minor modifications. 8 The 1990's revolution in the
Tougher Penalties on Juveniles, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Oct. 6, 1995, at C1 ; Gov.
Ridge Announces Signing of Key Juvenile Justice Bill; 'If You Commit an Adult Crime, You
Will Do Adult Time,' PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 22, 1995; John R. Sorensen, Pataki Plan on Juve-
niles Includes Longer Sentences in Adult Jails, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 10, 1995, at 16A;
Morning Edition: Governor Pete Wilson of California Sets State Agenda (National Public
Radio broadcast, Jan. 9, 1996) (Transcript #1777-10 on file with author); The Young Killers:
Adult Crimes Warrant Adult Time, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, June 10, 1996, at
A6; Judy Putnam, Engler Proposes "Punks" Do "Adult Time For Adult Crimes;" "What
Many of These Punks Need is Not a Social Worker but a Prison Cell," GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
July 27, 1995, at C3.
95 On average, the maximum prison sentence imposed on transfers convicted of murder
was 23 years and 11 months, nearly 2.5 years longer than the average maximum sentence for
adults over age 18 who were convicted of murder. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA
SICKMUND, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999
NATIONAL REPORT 178 (1999).
96 Id.
17 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
98 These factors include the seriousness of the offense, prosecutive merit, the sophistica-
tion and maturity of the child, the child's past history of delinquency, responses to prior ju-
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transfer laws, however, differed from past efforts to try more children
as adults in two significant ways: 1) the decision to transfer was less
often a judicial decision; it was now increasingly the province of
prosecutors or the legislatures, and 2) younger children could now be
tried as adults for a wider array of offenses.99
Minority youth bore the brunt of this new crackdown on juvenile
offenders. In 1997, for example, an estimated 8400 juveniles were
waived from juvenile court to adult court by judges, and minority
youth were much more likely to be transferred to the adult court sys-
tem for all offense categories."00 Although white youth made up
fifty-seven percent of cases petitioned to juvenile court for offenses
against persons, they represented only forty-five percent of such
cases waived to adult court. African Americans comprised forty per-
cent of all petitioned cases involving offenses against persons but
fifty percent of waived cases. The overrepresentation of minority
youth in transferred drug cases was even greater. While white youth
made up fifty-nine percent of juvenile court drug cases, only thirty-
five percent of all drug transfers involved white youth. African
Americans constituted thirty-nine percent of juvenile court drug
cases but sixty-three percent of those transferred to adult court.'
venile court efforts at rehabilitation, and the ability of the juvenile court's dispositions to re-
habilitate the child and protect the public. Id. at 566-67.
99 Twenty-three states now have at least one provision, typically governing children
charged with murder or other violent felonies, which places no bottom age limit for juveniles
to be transferred to criminal court. PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS 15 (1998). Legislative exclusion, however, is
not entirely a late twentieth century phenomenon. As Tanenhaus has written:
more research needs to be done into the question of how many children's cases were actually leg-
islatively excluded from juvenile courts in this period [i.e. the 1920's and 1930's]. By 1930, for
example, twenty state legislatures had excluded at least some offenses. They included: capital
crimes (Califomia [if aged eighteen to twenty-one], Delaware and Vermont); crimes punishable
by death or life imprisonment (Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, New York [ex-
cept in Chautauqua County]); murder (New Jersey and Pennsylvania) and felonies (Idaho and
Utah). The other states' excluded offenses did not fit into the above categories. In Florida, rape,
murder, manslaughter, robbery, arson, burglary, or attempts to commit one of these crimes were
excluded. Louisiana excluded capital crimes as well as attempted rape, but only capital crimes
were excluded in the Orleans Parish. New Hampshire excluded capital and certain other offenses.
In North and South Carolina, any felony punishable by ten or more years imprisonment was ex-
cluded. Rhode Island excluded murder as well as manslaughter. In Tennessee, crimes punishable
by life imprisonment or death were excluded, but in some counties only murder and rape were ex-
cluded.
Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer, supra note 23, at 42.0 EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME, 12 (2000),
available at www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/justiceforsome/jfs.html.
"' Id. at 12-13. In Cook County, Illinois, recent statistics indicate an even more dispro-
portionate impact of a select drug transfer law. In 1985, the Illinois General Assembly
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Judicial waivers, however, represent only the tip of the iceberg of
transferred juveniles. But because prosecutorial waivers and legisla-
tive waivers are more difficult to track, it is currently not known how
many total youths under eighteen years of age are prosecuted as
adults each year; at least one estimate places the number as high as
200,000.102 What is clear, however, is that as a result of the new
transfer laws of the 1990's, the bulk of transfer decisions are now
made by prosecutors or legislatures. A recent multi-jurisdictional
study of adult courts in eighteen large urban counties revealed that
eighty-five percent of all transfer decisions during a six-month pe-
riod from January 1, 1998, to June 30, 1998, were made by prosecu-
tors (forty-five percent) or legislatures (forty percent) instead of
judges." 3 Again, minority youth comprised the overwhelming major-
ity of transfers. During the study period, eighty-two percent of all
cases that were filed in adult courts involved minority youth; fifty-
seven percent of the total were African Americans, twenty-three per-
cent were Latinos, and the rest were Asians and American Indians.1
0 4
In all offense categories, the highest percentage of youths prosecuted
as adults were African American, including more than eighty-five
percent of drug charges and fifty-seven percent of violent offenses. 5
African Americans (forty-three percent) and Latinos (thirty-seven
percent) were also more likely to receive a sentence of incarceration
than white (twenty-six percent) youth.0 6
passed a law which made the crime of drug dealing within 1000 feet of school property an
"automatic transfer" offense for juveniles aged fifteen and older. The law was then amended
to include drug dealing within 1000 feet of public housing property. Data recently compiled
by the Cook County Public Defender's Juvenile Transfer Advocacy Unit shows that in the
past year, 390 of the 393 youth who were transferred pursuant to the laws were African
American and Latino. See Marc Mauer & Steven Drizin, Transfer Laws Victimize Fairness,
CHI. SuN-TMES, Dec. 27, 2000, at 41. These results were entirely predictable given that the
population of the Chicago Housing Authority, the largest owner of public housing property
in Cook County, is overwhelmingly minority, and that more minority youths live within
1000 feet of a school in the Cook County than do whites. See Sarah Karp, State Drug Law
Hits City Teens, Minorities, CH. REP., May, 2000, at 3.
102 POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 100, at 12. See also SNYDER & SICKMUND su-
pra note 95, at 106. Not all of the estimated 200,000 youths under eighteen who are prose-
cuted as adults each year are "transfers." Many of these youths come from the thirteen states
where the upper age limit for juvenile court jurisdiction is fifteen or sixteen, meaning that
their cases originate in adult court and that they are considered "adults" as soon as they are
arrested for a crime. Id.
103 Jolanta Juszkiewicz, Youth Crime/Adult Time: Is Justice Served?, BUILDING BLOCKS
FOR YOUTH, Feb. 2001, at 15, available at www.buildingblocksforyouth.org.
'
04 Id. at 16.
105 id.
106 Id. at 18.
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New York, Florida, and Texas had laid the groundwork for the
transfer revolution of the 1990's. °7 New York's Juvenile Offender
Law, passed in 1978, in the wake of a high profile double homicide
committed by fifteen-year-old Willie Bosket, was a watershed event
in the history of transfer. Bosket had shot and killed two men on the
subway and wounded another. At the time, the maximum punish-
ment for his crimes was only five years. Two days after Willie was
sentenced, Governor Hugh Carey, in the midst of a tight re-election
battle in which his opponent was labeling him as "soft on crime,"
embraced a new law proposing to try more juveniles as adults. A
week later, Carey called the legislature back into special session and
the Juvenile Offender Act was born. It was the first of the so-called
automatic transfer or legislative waiver laws, requiring that prosecu-
tors try kids as young as thirteen as adults for murder and imposing
similar adult-like penalties on conviction."'
Florida's pioneering contribution to the history of transfer laws
began in earnest in 1981 with the first of a series of laws which gave
prosecutors the power over the decision to transfer children to the
adult criminal courts for prosecution.0 9 In 1979, Florida enacted lim-
ited prosecutorial waiver legislation but soon amended it in 1981 to
give prosecutors nearly unfettered discretion to transfer sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds to the adult court system. Prosecutors could file
a criminal information against any sixteen or seventeen-year-old
charged with any violation of Florida law if in their "judgment and
discretion, the public interest requires that adult sanctions be im-
posed."'10 Prosecutors could also "direct file" in criminal court
against children aged fourteen and older who had previously been ad-
judicated delinquent of one of several violent felonies and who were
subsequently charged with such an offense."' Finally, Florida bor-
107 On changing state legislation in the 1970's and 1980's, see CHRISTOPHER P.
MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 169-177 (1998).
108 Willie Bosket's story and the birth of New York's Juvenile Offender Law are chroni-
cled in Fox BUTTERFIELD, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN: THE BOSKET FAMILY AND THE AMERICAN
TRADITION OF VIOLENCE 226-27 (1995). See also SIMON I. SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING
DELINQUENCY: VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 1-20 (1996).
'09 Florida's experience with prosecutorial waiver was first analyzed by Donna M.
Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and
Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281 (1991). For
a more recent critique of Florida's system, see VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZIEDENBERG,
THE FLORIDA EXPERIMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF GRANTING PROSECUTORS DISCRETION TO TRY
JUVENILES AS ADULTS (1999), available at www.cjcj.org.
... FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.0402(e)(4) (West 1988).
111 Id.
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rowed a page from New York's statute books, passing an automatic
transfer law that required prosecutors to seek an indictment of any
child, regardless of age, who is charged with a life felony or a capital
crime. Prosecutors had the discretion over what charges to bring, but
once they decided to charge a life felony or a capital crime, they had
no choice but to take the case before a grand jury. 12
In 1994, Florida greatly expanded its prosecutorial waiver stat-
utes, giving prosecutors the power to file charges directly in criminal
court against children aged fourteen and above accused of a wide ar-
ray of person, property and weapons offenses." 3 The net effect of
these changes was both instantaneous and dramatic. In 1995, Florida
prosecutors waived 7000 juveniles to adult court, nearly as many as
the 9700 juveniles waived by judges throughout the rest of the coun-
try. 1
14
Unlike Florida and New York, which chose to expand the num-
ber of children transferred to adult court by taking the decision out of
the hands of judges and giving it to prosecutors or legislators, Texas's
solution to juvenile violent crime was the Texas Determinate Sen-
tence Act, a law which foreshadowed what would later become
known as "blended sentencing.""' 5 Passed in 1987, this sentencing
scheme applies to violent juveniles and habitual offenders, aged ten
to sixteen, charged with any of six serious felonies (capital murder,
murder, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, deadly as-
sault on a law enforcement officer or a court participant, and at-
tempted capital murder)." 6 The decision to invoke the statute is
entirely entrusted to the prosecutors. If a prosecutor decides to in-
voke the statute, he presents the delinquency petition to a grand jury,
112 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.0205(c) (West 1988).
113 FLA. STAT., ANN. § 985.227 (West 2002) enabled prosecutors to file directly in the
criminal court against fourteen-years-olds charged with murder; manslaughter; sexual bat-
tery; robbery; kidnapping; aggravated child abuse; aggravated assault; aggravated stalking;
aggravated battery; lewd or lascivious assault or act in the presence of a child; arson; armed
burglary; burglary involving damage to a dwelling or structure; grand theft; carrying, dis-
playing, using, threatening, or attempting to use a weapon during the commission of a fel-
ony; unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. GRIFFIN
ET AL., supra note 99, at A2 1.
114 SCHIRALDI & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 109.
115 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 53.045, 54.04(d)(3) (Vernon 1996); Robert 0. Dawson, The
Violent Juvenile Offender: An Empirical Study ofJuvenile Determinate Sentencing Proceed-
ings as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 21 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1897 (1990); Robert
0. Dawson, The Violent Juvenile Offender: An Empirical Study ofJuvenile Determinate Sen-
tencing Proceeding as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecutions, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 943
(1988).
116 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.045(a) (Vernon 1996).
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which may approve the petition in the same manner that the grand
jury votes on the presentment of an indictment. Once a petition is
approved, juveniles receive the same substantive and procedural
rights as adult criminal defendants, including the right to a jury trial.
Upon conviction, juveniles begin their determinate sentences in
Texas Youth Commission facilities, and at age eighteen, a court con-
ducts a sentencing review hearing to decide whether they will serve
out the duration of their time in the juvenile correctional system or be
sent to the adult prison system to finish their sentences.' In 1995,
the Texas legislature expanded from the original list of six crimes to
thirteen offenses for which youths could receive determinate sen-
tences, and increased the maximum length of determinate sentences
from thirty to forty years."'
Most states today use a combination of judicial waiver, legisla-
tive waiver, prosecutorial waiver, and blended sentencing to deal
with violent juvenile offenders." 9 While judicial waiver statutes are
still the most common transfer provisions, legislative waivers and
prosecutorial waivers now make up the bulk of transferred juveniles.
These two more rigid transfer schemes are concerned generally with
only two of the Kent factors-the age of the offender and the serious-
ness of the offense. None of the factors relating to the child's poten-
tial for rehabilitation is relevant. Prosecutorial waiver statutes
generally do not provide any guidelines for the exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion, giving prosecutors carte blanche over when to file
cases in criminal court. Unlike judicial waiver decisions, which can
be reviewed by appellate courts, prosecutorial waiver decisions are
not subject to judicial review.' Nor are the charging decisions of
prosecutors that trigger automatic transfers. The only check against
abuses of prosecutorial discretion in both statutory schemes is the
grand jury, which today, unlike the grand juries at the turn of the cen-
tury, rarely, if ever, rejects prosecutorial requests for charges.
Earlier in this essay, we argued that in the formative years of the
Cook County Juvenile Court, a series of institutional checks against
the aggressive prosecution of juveniles as adults served to limit the
17 Dawson, supra note 115 at 984-999; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.11(k) (Vernon
1996).
118 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 53.045, 54.04(d)(3).
119 GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 99, at 1. See also Robert 0. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in
Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 45-
81.
120 Donna M. Bishop et al., Juvenile Justice Under Attack: An Analysis ofthe Causes and
Impact of Recent Reforms, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 140 (1998).
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numbers of juvenile offenders who were tried as adults. The case of
Mary Radek highlighted the important role of the coroner's jury in
deflecting juvenile cases from the criminal court. The Joseph Don-
nensberger, Jr. case illustrated the role that the grand jury assumed in
rejecting criminal charges in cases brought by prosecutors against
children. The Major Tucker case demonstrated that even in cases that
originated in criminal court, criminal court judges had the power to
either send juveniles back to the juvenile court or to impose juvenile
sanctions. 12'
In this section of the paper, we will use three contemporary cases
to demonstrate what happens to juvenile offenders under the new
transfer regime, a scheme that has few, if any, checks on prosecuting
children as adults and leaves judges and jurors with few options but
to convict juvenile defendants in adult court and sentence them
harshly. The plight of today's violent juvenile offender is dramati-
cally illustrated by the cases of three African American children:
Lacresha Murray, Nathaniel Abraham, and Lionel Tate.'22
1. The Case of Lacresha Murray and the Problem of Police
Interrogations
In late May 1996, the Travis County District Attorney's Office
charged eleven-year-old Lacresha Murray with capital murder in
connection with the death of two-year-old Jayla Belton. Belton, who
died of massive injuries, including a ruptured liver and several bro-
ken ribs, had been left in the care of Lacresha's grandparents, who
operated an unlicensed child-care facility in their home. Police sus-
pected Lacresha because she had been in Jayla's company near the
time of her death, and an autopsy report revealed that the toddler's in-
juries would have caused death within minutes of their infliction.'
121 Twenty-three states today provide some mechanism by which a juvenile who is being
prosecuted as an adult in criminal court can petition the criminal court to transfer the case
back to the juvenile court either for adjudication or sentencing. As of 1998, these "reverse
waiver" provisions were operational in twenty of the thirty-five states that had either prose-
cutorial waiver or automatic transfer statutes. GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 99, at 9-10. See
also Feld, supra note 93, at 119-124.
122 In the historical part of the essay, we referred to the cases by the names of the victims.
These early twentieth century cases did not generate much press coverage, and the stories
were framed in terms of the victim, not the accused. In this section we use the names of the
accused children, since these cases received extensive media coverage and the accused, not
the victim, became the focus of the story. The tendency to make the accused, not the victim,
the focus of the story is not a new development. See, e.g., DALE, supra note 3 1, at 20.
2 3Enedelia J. Obregon, County Seeks Rare Indictment on Girl in Toddler's Death,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 13, 1996, at BI; Dave Harmon, Jury Selection Today in
Girls' Trial, AuSTN AM.-STATESMAN, July 30, 1996, at 01.
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In announcing the charges of murder and injury to a child, District
Attorney Ronnie Earle declared, "This case appears to be unprece-
dented in our local history ... it just shows that Austin is not immune
from the hideous malady sweeping the country of children killing
children." '124 In June, Lacresha became the youngest girl indicted for
capital murder when a grand jury approved Earle's petition to try her
under the juvenile court system's Determinate Sentence Act. Capital
murder charges were automatic under Texas law because the victim
was under the age of six. Due to her age, Murray was ineligible for
the death penalty, but she could receive a maximum sentence of forty
years in prison, a sentence that Earle vowed to seek on the day the
indictment was returned. 2
The prosecution's case against Lacresha rested primarily on
statements that she had given to Austin detectives during a controver-
sial two hour and thirty minute videotaped interrogation. The detec-
tives interrogated her at the Texas Baptist Children's Home, a shelter
in which social workers had placed Lacresha after Jayla's death. Dur-
ing the questioning, Lacresha did not have the assistance of her par-
ents or other relatives, an adult guardian, or an attorney. Detectives
began the interview by reading Lacresha her Miranda rights off a
pre-printed card. Instead of asking her to explain back to them what
the rights meant, they accepted her simple affirmation that she under-
stood them.
After inducing Lacresha to admit that she was the only person in
the back room where Jayla was sleeping on the afternoon of her
death, the detectives told her that a doctor "with over twenty years of
experience" had found that the baby sustained her injuries during the
time that Lacresha was in the back room. Throughout the interroga-
tion, Lacresha denied having any knowledge of how the baby was in-
jured, even stating on one occasion, "I didn't do nothing, I promise to
God." Unable to make her crack, one detective suggested to Lacresha
that the baby may have been hurt in an accident, repeatedly telling
Lacresha that perhaps the baby slipped out of her arms while she was
carrying her. After repeated prompting, Lacresha finally told the de-
tectives what they wanted to hear-when she had picked up the baby
to take her to her grandpa, the baby fell and hit her head on the floor.
The detectives then asked Lacresha if she kicked the baby and after
124Bob Banta, Girl, 11, Arrested in Toddler's Death, Child Is Youngest in Recent Mem-
ory in Travis County, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 31, 1996, at A].
125Enedelia J. Obregon, Girl, 11, Should Get 40 Years, Earle Says, AUSTrN AM.-
STATESMAN, June 15, 1996, at BI; Q & A with Ronnie Earle And Staff, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Aug. 18, 1996, at F2.
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more prompting, Lacresha says: "Don't know, maybe ... I was try-
ing to run back and pick her up, probably I was trying like, my feet
probably kicked against her side or something."
26
Detectives then typed up the "confession" and presented it to
Lacresha to read. "Can you read pretty good?" a detective asked
Lacresha. "No," she responded, "but I try hard." As she struggled to
read the statement, Lacresha asked "what is a home-a-seed?" The
detectives corrected her pronunciation. She then asked again "what's
that?" Her question went unanswered. 1
27
The detectives continued to interrogate her because her statement
did not account for all the bruising on the toddler's body. They prod-
ded her for more details of the beating and repeatedly accused her of
not telling the truth. Finally, Lacresha refused to answer any more
questions, bringing the interrogation to a halt.
128
Before her trial, Lacresha's public defender sought to have her
statements suppressed, arguing that Lacresha did not understand her
Miranda warnings and that the statements were the product of sug-
gestive questioning. The trial court, however, held that Lacresha was
not in police custody at the time when the statements were made, and
admitted her statements into evidence. The State's case consisted of
the videotape and testimony from medical experts that the injuries
sustained by Jayla were not accidental in nature and that they oc-
curred within a few hours of her death, the very time period when she
was in a room frequented by Lacresha. A psychologist hired by the
State testified that Lacresha "could hold her own under police ques-
tioning," but told the jury, during cross-examination, that he did not
believe that Lacresha intended to kill Jayla.129 As a result of this tes-
timony, prosecutors backed away from the capital murder charge,
urging jurors to convict her of the lesser charge of intentional injury
to a child, a charge which also carries the same maximum sentence of
up to forty years in prison.".3 After deliberating for two days, the jury
126 A complete copy of the transcript of Lacresha's interrogation on May 29, 1996 can be
found at http://www.peopleoflheheart.org, a website devoted to her case.
127 Id.
128Id. Portions of Lacresha's interrogation also appeared in news articles. See, e.g., Bob
Herbert, In America: A Child's Confession, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, §4, at 15; Polly Ross
Hughes, Home at Last; After Second Conviction Is Overturned in Death of Toddler, Teen-
ager Awaits Word on Third Trial, HOUSTON CHRON., July 4, 1989, at 1.
129 Dave Harmon, Lesser Verdict Is Pursued in Girl's Trial, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Aug. 6, 1996, at Al.
i3o I.
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convicted Lacresha of the lesser charges of intentionally injuring a
child and criminally negligent homicide. 131
Under Texas Determinate Sentencing Act, the jury could sen-
tence Lacresha from probation to forty years in prison. They split the
difference and sentenced her to a twenty-year term. Under the terms
of the "blended sentence," Lacresha would have to spend at least
three years in a juvenile prison before becoming eligible for parole.
If she was not rehabilitated, she would have to remain in the juvenile
prison until age twenty-one, and could then be transferred to an adult
prison to serve out the remainder of her sentence. 32
Lacresha's conviction was only the first chapter in a legal saga
that was to take many twists and turns. In a rare move, just two
months after presiding over her jury trial, Judge John Dietz granted a
motion for a new trial. He granted the motion after hearing a day and
a half of testimony about the unfairness of the trial, focusing largely
on the ineffective representation provided by Lacresha's trial attor-
ney. Dietz told the stunned observers in the courtroom that he was
granting a new trial on his own motion, not the defense's motion, de-
claring, "this system is an adversarial system, designed to search for
the truth .... In this situation, I have to tell you, I have cause to ques-
tion as to whether or not justice is served." '33  District Attorney
Ronnie Earle, in the midst of a hard fought reelection campaign, was
so taken aback by the ruling that he remarked "Excuse me while I get
back up off the floor . . . . This is a nightmare. You couldn't have
shocked me more if you told me that Jesus Christ came back." '34
Prosecutors re-tried Lacresha for Jayla's death. The second trial
allowed both sides to correct the mistakes of the first trial. The
prosecution beefed up its motive evidence, suggesting that the motive
for the killing was Lacresha's anger at having to clean up the vomit
of Jayla who had been sick when she arrived at the Murray home that
morning. A new expert, Dr. Vincent DiMaio, the Medical Examiner
of neighboring Bexar County, testified that Jayla had been stomped
to death, telling jurors that the tread pattern on Murray's shoes
131 Dave Harmon, Girl Found Guilty of Toddler's Death, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug.
8, 1996, at Al.32 Dave Harmon, Girl Gets 20 Years in Death of Toddler, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Aug. 10, 1996, at Al.
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seemed to match bruises left on Jayla's torso perfectly.135 The de-
fense, who had failed to call any expert witnesses at Lacresha's first
trial, countered with an expert of its own. Dr. Linda Norton, a Dallas
pathologist, testified that Jayla was a chronically battered child.'36
Dr. Norton disagreed with the State's evidence' about the time of the
injuries, finding that Jayla's injuries could have been inflicted hours
before her death and that many of the bruises were a result of the ef-
forts by doctors in the emergency room to revive her through CPR.
Dr. Norton also disputed the testimony that the two parallel marks on
Jayla's torso were caused by a shoe, and stated that a broom handle
or belt were more likely to have caused them. 37
Despite the vigorous defense put on by her new lawyers, Lacre-
sha was convicted a second time of intentionally injuring a child.
This time around, however, Judge Dietz sentenced her to twenty-five
years in prison, a sentence to which both the prosecution and the de-
fense had agreed.'38
After her second conviction, and during the appeal, Lacresha's
case became a cause celebre. Barbara Taft, a legal secretary at a pres-
tigious Austin law firm, quit her job and began working full-time on
Lacresha's case. She set up a website and organized monthly
marches to protest her conviction.'39 New York Times columnist Bob
Herbert wrote a series of articles, which were highly critical of the
role of police and prosecutors in the case, and made a strong argu-
ment that Lacresha was innocent. 4 ° The television news magazine
show 60 Minutes did a piece on the case entitled "Juvenile Injustice?"
in which correspondent Mike Wallace got the Medical Examiner, Dr.
135 Dave Harmon, Murray's Shoe Matches Marks, Examiner Says, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Feb. 4, 1997, at BI.
136 Judge Dietz, in an interview with Mike Wallace of CBS's 60 Minutes, took the blame
for the defense's failure to call any experts, claiming that he did not authorize the defense to
spend the money needed to hire an expert. 60 Minutes: Juvenile Injustice (CBS television
broadcast, June 20, 1999), available at 1999 WL 16209064 [hereinafter 60 Minutes].
137 Dave Harmon, Witness: Toddler Had Abusive History, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb.
13, 1997, at B1.
138 Dave Harmon, Jury Finds Murray Guilty in Second Trial, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Feb. 18, 1997, at Al.
139 Polly Ross Hughes, Legal Secretary Fights for Girl, Now 15, Accused of Killing Tot,
HOUSTON CHRON., July 4, 1989, at 22.
140 See, e.g., Bob Herbert, In America: A Travesty in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1999, §
4, at 19; Bob Herbert, In America: Truth in Travis County, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1998, at
A39; Bob Herbert, In America: Without Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998, § 4, at 17;
Bob Herbert, In America: How Did Jayla Die?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1998, at A35; Bob
Herbert, In America: A Child's Confession, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, § 4, at 15.
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Vincent DiMaio, to back away from his testimony that the marks on
Jayla's torso were a perfect match to the tread of Lacresha's shoe.' 4'
On April 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals of Texas reversed
Lacresha's conviction, ruling that the trial court had erred when it
admitted Lacresha's recorded and written statements into evidence at
her trial. 4 2 The Court took issue with the trial court's finding that
Lacresha was not in custody at the time of her interrogation, holding
that "it is appropriate for Texas courts to consider the age of the ju-
venile in determining whether the child is in custody."' 43  The ap-
propriate standard, wrote the Court, is "whether, based upon
objective circumstances, a reasonable child of the same age would
believe her freedom of movement was significantly restricted.' 144
Looking at this question through the eyes of Lacresha, an eleven-
year-old girl who had never been through the legal system before,
who was isolated and alone throughout the interrogation, who was
the target of the police investigation, and who was never told she was
free to leave or that she could call her grandparents, the Court ruled
that Lacresha was in custody at the time of the interrogation.145
On April 21, 1999, after serving three years in state custody for a
crime she still adamantly insists she did not commit, Lacresha
Murray was freed from the Texas Youth Commission. 146 As of the
time of this writing, prosecutors still have not decided whether they
plan on trying her for a third time.'47 In the meantime, Lacresha's de-
fense attorneys have proffered new forensic evidence: magnified
slides from Jayla's autopsy that show that her injuries occurred sev-
141 60 Minutes, supra note 136. See also Diane Holloway, TV Show Questions Murray
Conviction; In '60 Minutes'Piece, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Jan. 17, 1999, at B1.
142 In re L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App. 1999). See also Leah Quin, Lacresha Case
Overturned, Court Rules Interview with Police Inadmissible, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr.
16, 1999, at A l; Interrogating Children, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1999, at A22.
143 In re L.M., 993 S.W.2d at 289.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 291. Texas law requires that before police may interview a child who is in po-
lice custody, officers must take the child before a magistrate to determine that the child is
capable of understanding his Miranda rights and of knowingly and intelligently waiving
them. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN., §51.095 (Vernon 1996). In the wake of the Lacresha Murray
case, Texas legislators passed a new law, dubbed "The Lacresha Murray" law which made
clear that children in the custody of the Department of Protective and Regulatory Services
are considered "in custody" and must be taken to a Magistrate before being questioned. Juan
B. Elizondo, Jr., Lacresha Law Clears Bush's Desk, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 20,
1999, at B 1.
146 John W. Gonzalez, Accused Child-Killer Released to Go Home; Teen Awaits 3rd
Trial in Tot's Beating Death, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 22, 1999, at 36.
147 Polly Ross Hughes, Home at Last; After Second Conviction Is Overturned in Death of
Toddler, Teenager Awaits Word on Third Trial, HOUSTON CHRON., July 4, 1999, at 1.
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eral hours before she died during a time-frame when she was not in
the care of Lacresha. They believe that this evidence clears Lacresha
of any crime.14
The Lacresha Murray case reveals not only a potential miscar-
riage of justice (i.e. the real possibility that an innocent person had
been sentenced to twenty-five years in prison) but also demonstrates
the inherent problems raised by prosecuting children as if they were
adults.'49 Her case raises disturbing questions about police interroga-
tions of children, and suggests the need for reforms in this early step
in the legal process.15 0
148 Leah Quin, Microscope Might Come to LaCresha's Aid; Cells Show Toddler Who
Died Was Hurt Before Girl Saw Her, Expert Says, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 25, 2000,
at Al.
149 On the inherent problem in trying children as adults, see YOUTH ON TRIAL: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz
eds., 2000) [hereinafter YOUTH ON TRIAL].
150 On the eve of the centennial of the juvenile court, in July 1998, the Cook County
court system received a wake-up call about one of the special problems inherent in interro-
gating children-the increased risk of false confessions. This wake-up call, the Ryan Har-
ris case, is said to have "come to symbolize how poorly the justice system handles kids." On
July 27, 1998, an eleven-year-old girl named Ryan Harris disappeared. Her body was dis-
covered less than twenty-four hours later only two blocks from where she was last seen.
She had been badly beaten about the head, her underpants stuffed in her mouth in an appar-
ent attempt to gag her, and there was evidence she had been sexually assaulted. On Sunday,
August 9, 1998, the Chicago Police charged two boys, aged seven and eight, with the murder
of Ryan Harris in a delinquency petition with first-degree murder. According to the police,
the boys gave statements that contained details of the crime that only the true killers would
have known after being interrogated by detectives without a parent, guardian or attorney by
their side. Three weeks later, in a stunning move, prosecutors announced that they were
dropping charges against the boys because the crime lab had discovered semen on the girl's
underpants. DNA found on Ryan Harris was later shown to match perfectly with the DNA
of Floyd M. Durr, an adult already charged with sexually assaulting three other young girls
in the Englewood neighborhoods. In the wake of the Ryan Harris case, the Illinois General
Assembly passed a new law requiring that all children under the age of thirteen who are sus-
pects in homicides and sexual assault cases must have an attorney present with them before
police may interrogate them. A bill to require that all interrogations of suspects in homicide
cases be videotaped was also introduced in the Illinois General Assembly but has so far
failed to be enacted into law. For information about the Ryan Harris case and other Illinois
cases involving children and adults who may have falsely confessed to murder and the need
to videotape custodial interrogations, see Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cam-
eras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois' Problem of
False Confessions, 32 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 335 (2001). See also Marla Donato, 2 Boys, 7 and 8,
Cited in Killing, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 1998, at 1, available at 1998 WL 28844384; Abraham
McLaughlin, Easing Get-Tough Approach on Juveniles: Chicago, Backing the National
Trend, Stresses Rehabilitation Over Punishment for the Very Young, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 16, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 5381608; Metro Briefs, CI. SUN-
TIMES, July 30, 1998, at 20, available at 1998 WL 5591543; Maurice Possley, Police Re-
ports Could Aid Boys: How Cops Built Case; Adult Male Listed as Early Suspect, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 16, 1998, at 1, available at 1998 WL 2886101; Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Tests
Find Semen on Girl's Clothes, CHi. TRIB., Sept. 5, 1998, at 1, available at 1998 WL
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2. The Lionel Tate Case and the Problem of Mandatory Sentencing
Six-year-old Tiffany Eunick died on July 28, 1999 after playing
for much of the day with twelve-year-old Lionel Tate, a 166-pound
boy who claimed that he had been practicing professional wrestling
moves on the girl as they played in his Pembroke, Florida home. The
medical examiner's findings did not support Lionel's claims that he
and Tiffany were involved in innocuous roughhousing. Lionel's
story that he had picked up Tiffany in a bear hug while they were
playing tag and accidentally hit her head on a coffee table did not
square with the evidence of her extensive injuries, including head
trauma, lacerations to her liver, and several broken ribs. Broward
County prosecutors brought Lionel's case before a grand jury, seek-
ing charges of murder in adult court. After listening to medical tes-
timony and other witnesses, the grand jury indicted Lionel for first-
degree murder, making him among the youngest children in the coun-
try to face such charges in adult court.15 Under Florida's statutory
scheme, if Tate were convicted of first-degree murder, the judge
would have no choice but to sentence him to life in prison without the
possibility of parole.' 2
On February 15, 2000, Broward County prosecutors reportedly
offered to let Tate plead guilty to second-degree murder in exchange
for a sentence of three years in a juvenile center, one year of house
arrest, ten years of psychological testing and counseling, and 1000
hours of community service.'53 Lionel, his mother, and his attorney,
Jim Lewis, rejected the offer. The case took a bizarre twist when
Lewis announced that he planned to argue that his client was imitat-
ing the moves he had learned from watching professional wrestlers
on television. When Lewis sought to subpoena several pro wrestling
2892765; Jeremy Manier & Sue Ellen Christian, Crime Lab Findings All in a Day's Work,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 6, 1998, at 14, available at 1998 WL 2893015; John McCormick & Peter
Annin, Who Killed Ryan Harris? NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1998, at 42; Pam Belluck, Boys' Re-
lease in a Murder Doesn't End a City's Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1998, at A8, available at
1998 WL 5428643; Christi Parsons, Ryan OKs Safeguard for Young Suspects, Cn. TRIB.,
July 8, 2000, at IA; Dave McKinney, Videotape Bill Fails in House: Police Won't Have to
Film Confessions, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Mar. 26, 1999, at 18, available at 1999 WL 6531564.
For more information about these topics generally, see the website of the Northwestern Uni-
versity Legal Clinic: http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/news/index.htm#false.
151 Jodie Needle, Boy Charged with Murder in Death of Playmate, 6, SUN SENTINEL,
Aug. 12, 1999, at 1B.
152 Karla Schuster, Judges Tough Choice: Life or Leniency for Young Killer, SUN
SENTINEL, Jan. 28, 2001, at IA.
153 Crucial Events in the Murder of Tiffany Eunick and the Trial of Lionel Tate, athttp://www.sun-sentinel.connews/daily/detail/O,1 136,3600000000016/036,00.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2001).
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stars to testify at trial, including the Rock, Sting, and Hulk Hogan, the
move prompted a backlash from attorneys representing the wrestlers.
"Tate's defense is an 'I saw it on t.v. so I go free' excuse," exclaimed
Jerry McDevitt, a Pittsburgh attorney who represents Dwayne "the
Rock" Johnson.'54 He "is just a 12-year-old punk who didn't learn
that you don't beat up little girls."'55 The World Wrestling Federa-
tion, the largest organization of professional wrestling promotions,
sued Lewis for libel.1
5 6
Two weeks before the trial was to begin, on January 5, 2001,
prosecutors again offered Lionel the same plea deal. He rejected it a
second time.'57 It was a decision that Tate, his mother, and his attor-
ney would come to regret. After deliberating just over three hours,
jurors returned a verdict convicting the boy of first-degree murder.
Florida's rigid, inflexible transfer and sentencing scheme left
many of the participants in the Lionel Tate case unhappy and feeling
that the result was too harsh. "I wish there was another alternative.
It's horrible," remarked Kathleen Pow-Sang, a juror in the Tate case
who wept and prayed with others in the jury room as they struggled
for a way out of a decision they felt was being forced on them by an
unjust law. She told reporters that she and other jurors "were all an-
noyed" that the case was not brought in juvenile court.'58 "I don't
think anybody there thought that [Lionel] intended to kill her, but the
154 Paula McMahon, Judge Excuses Wrestlers from Testifying in Murder Trial, SUN SEN-
TINEL, Apr. 12, 2000 at IA.
15 5 Id.
156 Brad Bennett, Attorney Second-Guesses Strategy, MiAMi HERALD, Jan. 26, 2001, at
A8.
157 Can a twelve or thirteen-year-old child like Lionel Tate be expected to appreciate
the consequences of pleading guilty to murder in adult court? Can he or she truly understand
the jeopardy faced by rejecting a plea? Can a present-oriented, impulsive adolescent possi-
bly fathom a sentence of life without the possibility of parole? These are just a few of the
questions of "adjudicative competence" posed by the Lionel Tate case and others. Such
questions, which raise concerns about the fundamental fairness of trying children as adults,
were ignored by policymakers in their rush to pass punitive laws. The answers to these and
other questions are being studied by the Research Network on Adolescent Development, an
initiative funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Although more
research is necessary, two of the Network's members, Richard Bonnie and Thomas Grisso,
after reviewing the research on the ability of juvenile offenders to participate meaningfully
in their defenses and other studies about the decision-making ability of adolescents, have
recommended that "juvenile court jurisdiction should be exclusive in cases involving defen-
dants below the age of fourteen at the time of the alleged offense." Richard J. Bonnie &
Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, su-
pra note 149, at 92.
158 Caroline J. Keough, 'I Wish There Was Another Alternative. It's Horrible;' Jurors
Say They Felt Decision Was Imposed on Them by an Unjust Law, MiAMi HERALD, Jan. 26,
2001, at 8A.
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state didn't have to prove that. I think it was too easy for them" said
Steve Danker, another juror. Danker told reporters that he desper-
ately wanted to factor Lionel's age into the verdict but had sworn not
to do so during jury selection. During voir dire, prospective jurors
who had said they couldn't render a verdict without considering
Lionel's age had been dismissed." 9
Both the assistant state's attorney who prosecuted Tate and the
attorney who defended him were troubled by the final result. Tate's
attorney Jim Lewis, holding back tears, second-guessed the decision
to reject the plea and implored members of the jury and others to
convince the trial judge to show leniency: "I don't think that any
compassionate, rational human being would sit still and let this child
spend the rest of his life in prison." 60 Ken Padowitz, the man who
prosecuted Tate, announced that after Tate's mandatory life sentence
was imposed, he would take the unusual step of recommending to
Governor Jeb Bush that he commute Tate's sentence. 6' In fact, a lit-
tle over a week after the verdict, Padowitz and Lewis revealed that
they had a mutual understanding before trial that if Lionel were found
guilty of first-degree murder, they would travel together to Tallahas-
see to ask the governor for mercy.'62
Even before the Tate verdict, Florida legislators had begun to
question whether the state's inflexible laws left too few options for
serious juvenile offenders. The case of Nathaniel Brazill, a thirteen-
year-old first time offender who shot and killed his teacher, Barry
Grunow, sparked one such legislator, Ron Klein, a Democratic Sena-
tor from Boca Raton, to propose that Florida create a blended sen-
tencing option to give judges the ability to mitigate a mandatory life
without parole sentence for juveniles convicted of murder.'63 In the
wake of the Tate verdict, Klein vowed to step up his efforts to come
up with some alternatives for a system that has, in his words, grown
"pretty rigid." "In the legislature," Klein was quoted as saying, "we
sit here and create laws in a vacuum: this crime gets this punish-
159 Id.
160 Brad Bennett, Attorney Second-Guesses Strategy, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 26, 2001, at
8A.
161 Paula McMahon, Prosecutor Favors Lighter Sentence for 13-Year-Old Convicted of
First-Degree Murder, SUN SENTINEL, Jan. 27, 2001, at IA.162 William Yardley, Pretrial Pact: A Break For Boy, Court Foes Agreed to Seek Clem-
ency, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 4, 2001, at IA.
163 Rick Bragg, Teacher Slaying Forces Debate on Trying Children as Adults: No Leni-
ency, No Middle Ground in Florida, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 25, 2000, at
A21.
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ment .... But you know something? Sometimes there are extenuat-
ing circumstances."" 4 Klein may have also found an unlikely ally in
Harry Shorstein, the Jacksonville State's Attorney, a man known for
aggressively prosecuting juveniles as adults. In the aftermath of the
Tate verdict, Shorstein remarked: "Our system doesn't give us the
means with which to deal with these types of cases. Without sound-
ing harsh, there's not much we can do with the very, very serious
cases under the law we have now. We are writing them off."' 65
Perhaps these reactions to the Lionel Tate case signal the begin-
ning of a movement to repeal mandatory sentencing laws of serious
and violent juvenile offenders, but only time will tell. And, as the
next case suggests, in the meantime we must pay close attention to
the inherent problems raised by aggressively prosecuting children and
adolescents who are not yet developmentally capable to participate in
their own defenses.
3. Nathaniel Abraham and the Problem ofAggressive Prosecution
In his 1997 State of the State Address, Michigan Governor John
Engler boasted, "In 1996, after a four year battle, we enacted the
toughest juvenile crime package in the nation." Singling out juvenile
crime as "one of the nation's most serious problems," Engler an-
nounced, "[N]ow, juveniles who commit adult crime will do adult
time. These violent young felons will do their time under the watch-
ful eyes, not of social workers, but of prison guards.' 66 Michigan's
new juvenile crime package made sweeping changes. Before the new
laws took effect in 1997, no child under the age of fifteen could be
tried as an adult. Under the new package, the age limit was lowered
from fifteen to fourteen. 67 Moreover, the new laws greatly empow-
ered prosecutors, giving them sole discretion over whether to file
charges against juveniles charged with serious crimes in either juve-
nile or criminal court.
68
A third provision of the package enabled prosecutors to ask a ju-
venile court judge to impose adult sanctions against a child of any
age facing any charge pursuant to a "blended sentencing" scheme. In
order to activate "blended sentencing," prosecutors had to designate
164 Yardley, supra note 162.
165 id.
166 Gov. John Engler, State of the State Address (Jan. 28, 1997), SOUTH BEND TRIB., Jan.
29, 1997, available at www.southbendtribune.com.
167MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.4 (West 1993).
168MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.606 (West 1996).
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the case at the outset as a case in which the juvenile would be tried in
the same manner as an adult. A judge would then have to decide,
based upon a balancing of Kent-like factors but giving greater weight
to the seriousness of the offense and the child's prior history, whether
to grant the State's request. If the request were granted, the juve-
nile's trial and sentencing would take place in juvenile court with all
the procedural protections and guarantees given to adult criminal de-
fendants. If convicted, the trial court had three sentencing options at
its disposal: 1) juvenile sanctions, meaning the juvenile would be re-
leased no later than age twenty-one; 2) blended sanctions in which
the juvenile is sentenced to both a juvenile and an adult sentence; the
adult sentence is stayed but could be imposed any time up to age
twenty-one if the juvenile violates the terms of his juvenile sentence;
or 3) adult penalties."'
In 1995, when this "blended sentencing" option was first pro-
posed, one of its supporters was Judge Eugene A. Moore, then presi-
dent of the state probate judges association and a thirty-year veteran
of hearing juvenile cases. In a letter to The Detroit News, dated Au-
gust 13, 1995, Judge Moore explained, "the Association proposes that
juvenile judges retain jurisdiction over serious juvenile offenders
providing for a periodic review of these cases and the power to place
non-rehabilitated offenders in our adult prisons until they are safe
and back on the streets." 7' Little did Judge Moore know that he
would be the first to put the new blended sentencing laws to use in
the landmark case of Nathaniel Abraham.
About 10:30 p.m. on October 29, 1997, a bullet sped through a
clump of trees next to the Sunset Plaza Party Store in suburban De-
troit and struck eighteen-year-old Ronnie Greene, Jr. in the head as
he exited a convenience store.17 1 Two days later, after receiving a tip
from a neighbor that Nathaniel Abraham had been seen firing a rifle,
police apprehended Abraham from his grammar school. At the time
of his arrest, Abraham was dressed in Halloween attire, wearing face
paint and makeup. He was eleven years old, stood four feet nine
inches, and weighed approximately sixty-five pounds.172
169MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2d (West 2002). See also GRIFFIN ET AL., supra
note 99, at app. 40, app. 41.
170 Moore v. Moore, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 16, 2000, at C8.
171 Jim Dyer, Children Accused of Killing Children: Young Life Lost, Younger One in
Jeopardy, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 10, 1998, at Al.
172 20/20: He's Only a Child, Should an 11-Year-Old Be Tried as an Adult? (ABC
television broadcast, Feb. 13, 1998), available at 1998 WL 5433498; Adult Murder Trialfor
Boy, 11, CHI. TRIB. Nov. 4, 1997, at 3; William Claiborne, Teenager's Trial as Adult Puts
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At the time of his arrest, Nathaniel was no stranger to the Pontiac
police; the sixth grader was a suspect in twenty-three crimes, includ-
ing a number of burglaries, home invasions, and assaults.173 The ar-
resting officers took the boy down to the police station for
questioning, stopping on the way to inform his mother. Nathaniel's
mother was present with him during the questioning and both he and
his mother signed a document indicating that they understood and
agreed to waive the boy's Miranda rights. After initially denying in-
volvement in the shooting, Abraham finally admitted to firing the
shot that killed Greene, although he claimed he was just target shoot-
ing at some trees with the stolen .22 rifle.174
Oakland County prosecutors did not accept Nathaniel's conten-
tion that the shooting was an accident. They had a neighbor, Michael
Hudack, the same man who tipped them off about Nathaniel, who
claimed that Nathaniel had been firing the gun at him just hours be-
fore Greene's death. Prosecutors quickly rounded up other witnesses
who claimed that Nathaniel had vowed to shoot someone and had
bragged about killing someone shortly after Greene's death.' Using
Michigan's new blended sentencing provisions, prosecutors charged
Abraham as an adult in juvenile court with first-degree murder, two
firearms violations, and attempted murder in connection with the
shooting at Hudack. If convicted of first-degree murder, Abraham
would receive a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
parole.1 6 In defending the decision to charge Abraham as an adult,
James Halushka, assistant district attorney, said: "It's horrifying that
someone this young can be so violent, he's a violent, violent person.
He may be 11 chronologically, but he's a menace to society. '
1 77
"When am I going to go home," were the first words uttered by
the eleven-year-old Nathaniel Abraham to his attorney, Daniel Bag-
dade, upon meeting him in court for the first time. Bagdade, who re-
called these words two years later on the eve of thirteen-year-old
Focus on Trend; Michigan Boy Was II at Time of Homicide; 46 States Have Lowered Bar-
riers, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at A3; Ron French & Kim Kozlowski, Does Nate Under-
stand His Plight?: While a Courtroom Full of Lawyers Debate, Accused Teen Asks, 'When
Do I Get to Go Home?,' DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 22,1999, at Al.
1 Dyer, supra note 171, at Al.
174 13-Year-Old and Michigan Juvenile Law-Under Fire in Murder Trial, Court TV
Online Trials, at www.courttv.com/trials/abraham/sentence text ctv.html.
"' 20/20: He's Only a Child, Should an 11-Year-Old Be Tried as an Adult?, supra.note
172.
176 Adult Murder Trial for Boy, I1, supra note 172, at 3.
177 Charles Laurence, Boy 1], Accused of Murder Opens Debate Over Lost Generation,
DAILY TELEGRAPH LONDON, Nov. 4, 1997, at 16.
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Nathaniel's trial, remarked, "He didn't have a clue what was going
on . . . he still doesn't."'78 Nathaniel's lack of understanding was
evident to Judge Moore in May of 1998 when he ruled that prosecu-
tors could not use Abraham's confession in his trial, finding that the
boy, whom psychologists had found functioned at the level of be-
tween a six and eight-year-old, could not have understood his
Miranda rights and the consequences of giving them up. 7 9 Prosecu-
tors appealed the decision and nearly a year later, the Court of Ap-
peals of Michigan reversed Judge Moore's decision, holding that
Nathaniel's "level of mental impairment falls far short of the severity
required to render defendant incapable of knowingly waiving his
Miranda rights. 18 °
When Nathaniel Abraham's case finally went to trial in Novem-
ber 1999, he found himself in the middle of a media firestorm, the
likes of which had never been seen before in the modem history of
juvenile court. The attention to his case only escalated when, in the
midst of jury selection, the flamboyant Michigan trial lawyer, Geof-
frey Fieger, best known for his representation of Dr. Jack Kervorkian,
assumed the lead role in representing Nathaniel.' 8 ' Court T.V. pro-
vided gavel to gavel coverage of the proceedings,'82 and Fieger ar-
ranged for Nathaniel to be interviewed by Ed Bradley of CBS's 60
Minutes during the trial.'83
Fieger argued that the shooting of Ronnie Greene, Jr. was an ac-
cident, the result of "child's play" with a gun. He argued that as a
mildly retarded child, who functioned intellectually at the level of a
178 French & Kozlowski, supra note 172.
179 James A. McClear, Murder Confession Thrown Out: Judge Says Nathaniel Abra-
ham, 12, Wasn't Clear on Rights During Pontiac Investigation, DETROIT NEWS, May 8, 1998,
at CI.
180 In re Abraham, 599 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). The decision of the
Michigan appellate court in the Abraham case is in stark contrast to the decision of the Texas
Court of Appeals in the Lacresha Murray case. See supra text accompanying notes 127-46.
In the Murray case, the court viewed the interrogation through the eyes of the II year-old-
girl, giving great weight to her youth, inexperience, and lack of understanding of the conse-
quences of speaking to the police. In the Abraham case, the appellate court criticized the
trial court for giving too much weight to these developmental factors, holding that if factors
such as a defendant's youth, learning disabilities, and emotional impairment are given too
much weight, the obligations of police would be elevated to "unreasonable levels." Abra-
ham, 599 N.W.2d at 741.
181 Pete Waldmeir, Trial of Boy Accused of Murder Is Perfect Case for Fieger, DETROIT
NEWS, Oct. 22, at CI.
182 Rob Brown, Death Row's Lethal Lottery, SUNDAY HERALD, Nov. 14, 1999, at 15,
available at 1999 WL 22707060; French & Kozlowski, supra note 172.
183 Louise Knott, CBS May Interview Nathaniel: Judge Allows Pontiac Teen Accused of
Slaying to Be on '60 Minutes' Program, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 28, 1999, at D1.
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six to eight-year-old, Nathaniel could not form the intent necessary
to kill.'84 Prosecutors painted a far more sinister portrait of the boy,
arguing that Nathaniel was a premeditated killer who had talked of
killing someone in the days before the shooting and followed through
with his plans. After eighteen hours of deliberation over four days,
the jury reached its verdict.'85  Nathaniel was acquitted of first-
degree murder but convicted of second-degree murder, meaning that
jurors found that he either intended to kill or injure Greene or knew
that his actions created a high risk of death or injury but could not
find that he plotted to kill Greene.'86
The jury's verdict set the stage for Judge Eugene A. Moore's
much-anticipated sentencing of Nathaniel Abraham. He could sen-
tence Nathaniel as a juvenile, as an adult, or impose a blended sen-
tence that treated Nathaniel initially as a juvenile and then later as an
adult. If the judge sentenced Nathaniel only as a juvenile, he could
commit the boy to a maximum-security juvenile detention center, but
Nathaniel would have to be released before he turned twenty-one,
even if he had not been rehabilitated and still posed a serious threat to
public safety.'87 Alternatively, the judge could sentence Nathaniel
only as an adult and send him to adult prison for eight to twenty-five
years. The judge also had the option of using a blended sentence that
would allow him to commit the boy first to a juvenile detention cen-
ter, but then hold a second sentencing hearing when Nathaniel was
between his eighteenth and twenty-first birthdays.'88 At the second
hearing, if the judge determined that Nathaniel had not yet been reha-
bilitated, he could transfer him to adult prison to serve the remainder
of his eight to twenty-five year sentence. The prosecutors recom-
mended that the judge exercise this third option.'89
Judge Moore turned to history to frame his decision in terms of
the foundational principles of American juvenile justice: that chil-
dren are qualitatively different from adults, and that the state has a re-
sponsibility to implement individualized treatment plans that would
184 William Claiborne, 13-Year-Old Convicted in Shooting; Decision to Try Youth as an
Adult Sparked Juvenile Justice Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1999, at A03.
185 Id.
186 Boy 13, Convicted of Second Degree Murder, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1999, at 19.
187 See In re Abraham, No. 97 63787 FC (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.courttv.com/trials/abraham/sentencetextctv.html.
188 Id.
189 Aldina Vazao Kennedy & Latoya Hunter, Abraham Sentenced to Juvenile Detention,
at http://www.courttv.com/trials/abraham/01 1300_2ctv.html (last modified Jan. 13, 2002).
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seek to rehabilitate juvenile delinquents. 9 ' After providing a brief
history of American juvenile justice, including Michigan's rewriting
of its juvenile laws in the 1990's, the judge turned to "the case at
hand, Nathaniel Abraham.' 9' He reviewed the boy's case and as-
sessed the three possible dispositional options. He rejected sentenc-
ing Nathaniel as a adult, since this decision would imply:
[That] we have given up on the Juvenile Justice System. Can we be cer-
tain that between now and the time he turns 21 that we can't change his
behavior? Must we say today that Nathaniel, at age 13, must be put into
an adult prison system? No, the testimony and/or reports are clear that
the adult prison system is not designed for youth. It is only a last resort
if the Juvenile system has failed. Testimony and the psychological ex-
amination demonstrate that in the last two years, while awaiting trial,
Nathaniel has made progress in the Juvenile system. It is also clear that
the adult system has very few treatment alternatives for a 13-year-old.
In addition, at 13, Nathaniel may be subject to brutalization in prison
that could destroy any hope of rehabilitation."'
For these reasons, Judge Moore rejected this option.
The judge then briefly discussed sentencing Nathaniel as a juve-
nile, while noting "if we rehabilitate the Defendant, then the public is
safe. If we don't, he may kill again."'' 9 3 This succinct two paragraph
discussion of sentencing Nathaniel as a juvenile suggested that the
judge would follow the prosecutors' recommendations and use the
third option, a blended sentence.
In a bold move, Judge Moore rejected the blended sentence, and
instead sentenced Nathaniel as a juvenile. He explained:
[I]f we were to impose a delayed sentence, we take everyone off the
hook. Sentencing Nathaniel as a juvenile gives us 8 more years to reha-
bilitate him. We as a community know that he will be back among us at
age 21. If we are committed to preventing future criminal behavior, we
will use our collective efforts and financial resources to rehabilitate him
and all the other at-risk youth in our community. If we commit our-
selves to this, we can ensure our safety now and in the future. The
safety net of a delayed sentence removes too much of the urgency. We
can't continue to see incarceration as a long term solution. The danger
190 The text of Nathaniel Abraham's Sentence is on-line at
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is that we won't take rehabilitation seriously if we know we can utilize
prison in the future.
194
This decision stunned court watchers, but Judge Moore was not
finished.
He concluded by directing remarks to Nathaniel Abraham. After
explaining to the boy "[y]ou have done probably the worst thing any
one can do and that is to kill another human being,"'95 he declared:
We as a community have failed you, but you have also failed us and
yourself. I will be keeping a very close eye on you and your progress.
When you are able to fully understand what I am telling you, I urge you
to take advantage of the help we are trying to give you. The only thing
you can do to begin to repair the damage you have caused to the Green
[sic] family is succeed. Don't let Mr. Green's [sic] death be in vain.
Help us help you and in turn help many other children in this commu-
nity. No one can do it for you. You must do it for yourself. 
196
Just how much of Judge Moore's landmark decision was under-
stood by Nathaniel Abraham-a decision which gave the boy a sec-
ond chance at a productive, meaningful life-is unclear. The boy,
who fidgeted and doodled during the judge's twenty-minute
speech,' 9 turned to his attorney, Daniel Bagdade, after the judge had
concluded, and asked, "What happened?"' 9' When Bagdade told him
that he was going to a juvenile facility instead of an adult prison, the




197 L.L. Brasier & Hugh McDiarmid, Jr., Abraham Avoids Hard Prison Time: 13-Year-
Old Killer Is Sent to Juvenile Detention Facility, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 14, 2000, at 1.
198 David Goodman, Judge Spares I 1-Year-Old Killer from Life in Prison, AP WIRES,
Jan. 14, 2000. See also Mitch Albom, We Can't Afford the Death of Hope, TIMES UNION (Al-
bany), Jan. 19, 2000, at A15.
199 Albom, supra note 198, at A15. A similar reaction from an equally befuddled
twelve-year-old child in the center of a high profile murder trial is described by Gitta Ser-
eny, in her classic 1998 book about Mary Bell, an eleven-year-old girl who was accused
and later convicted of murdering two small boys in Northern England in 1968. GITTA
SERENY, CRIES UNHEARD: WHY CHILDREN KILL; THE STORY OF MARY BELL (1998). Nearly
thirty years after being convicted, Bell, who was far more intelligent than Nathaniel Abra-
ham, spoke to Sereny about what it felt like to be on trial for murder as a small child:
In the court, while they were talking and talking, I remember thinking of what I would say when it
was my turn, I'd tell them I wanted my dog. I wanted him with me when they sent me to be
hanged. That's what I thought would happen: I'd be sent to the gallows and they might just as well
have said that right away because it was just as meaningless as life imprisonment or ... well ...
death. None of it meant a damn thing, not a thing.
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The reaction to Judge Moore's decision was swift and mixed.
Eliana Drakopoulos, a spokesperson for Amnesty International, who
had used Nathaniel's picture to adorn the cover of a report titled "Be-
traying the Young, ' 200 stated, "This is a victory for human rights and,
hopefully, a small step forward in the way the United States treats its
children in the juvenile justice system. '2°' The Reverend Al Sharp-
ton, who was present at the sentencing to show his support for Na-
thaniel, said, "The judge said some strong and compassionate things.
He convicted the system but he incarcerated Nathaniel. We do not
believe Nathaniel is guilty of murder. '02 Nicole Greene, sister of the
victim, decried the verdict, "My brother did not deserve to be gunned
down like a dog in the street .... A lot of people have forgotten who
the real victim is-and it's Ronnie Greene Jr., 213
For their part, neither the defense attorneys nor the prosecutors
were pleased with the judge's decision. Geoffrey Fieger continued to
insist that Nathaniel was innocent and vowed to seek a new trial:
"The fact of the matter is that Nathaniel isn't guilty of murder. He's a
child playing with a gun. 204  Oakland county assistant prosecutor
Lisa Halushka, who had hoped for a blended sentence, was equally
dismayed, "I'm disappointed. Disappointed and hopeful. I'm hope-
ful the judge is right and eight years can rehabilitate him. 2 11
The state officials who bore the brunt of Judge Moore's wrath
seemed unfazed and unwilling to reconsider the harsh 1996 package
of juvenile justice laws. Susan Shafer, spokesman for Governor John
Engler, told reporters, "the governor feels when the Legislature made
this decision, it gave prosecutors and judges the ability to use this
power on a case by case basis. He thinks it was a good law and it
was put there to allow prosecutors and judges to use it as they see
fit. 2 ° 6 State legislators, stung by Judge Moore's criticism, were more
critical. "What bothers me about (Moore's) opinion is there comes a
point where you have to be concerned about the safety of the public,"
said Republican State House Speaker, Chuck Perricone. "Are twelve
Id. at 124.
200 French & Kozlowski, supra note 172; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 12.
201 Young Murderer Quotes, AP WIRES, 15:53:00, Jan. 13, 2000.
202 Id.
203 id.
204 Id.; see also Louise Knott & Oralander Brand-Williams, Young Killer Gets Juvenile
Detention: State's Get-Tough Policy Blasted by Sentencing Judge, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 14,
2000, at Al.
205 Goodman, supra note 198.
206 Id.
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and thirteen-year-old young men short of full development? Of
course. But I don't know of any twelve and thirteen-year-olds that
don't understand that murder is wrong. 2 7  State Senator William
Van Regenmorter, a Republican who sponsored the blended sentenc-
ing law, called Judge Moore's decision illogical. "There is a really
powerful motivation for rehabilitating because at the age of twenty-
one, if you're not, you're going to go to prison.,
218
The cases of children such as Lacresha Murray, Lionel Tate, and
Nathaniel Abraham all put the new transfer regime on trial, by raising
troubling moral and legal questions about the aggressive prosecution
of children and adolescents who were not developmentally capable of
fully participating in their own defenses. We are still awaiting the
public's verdict on this new regime.
CONCLUSION: INSTALLING INSTITUTIONAL CHECKS
Through a comparison of past practices with contemporary
trends, we have argued that the twentieth century has witnessed a
transformation in the legal response to juvenile homicide. The flexi-
ble system that often protected children from being prosecuted as
adults in the early twentieth century has been replaced over time.
The new transfer regime, which coalesced in the 1990's, was charac-
terized by more transfer mechanisms to an adult criminal justice sys-
tem that had replaced the rehabilitative ideal with punitive
procedures, such as the abolition of parole and the reliance upon
"truth-in-sentencing" laws. Whereas youth had been a mitigating
factor in juvenile homicide cases in the early twentieth century, it had
become a legal liability by century's end.20 9
207 Id.
208 Knott, supra note 183.
209 According to Donna Bishop and Charles Frazier:
There has also been some discussion of a "leniency gap" within the criminal courts, the suggestion
being that transferred offenders receive lesser punishments than comparable adults, in part because
they are "first-timers" to the criminal justice system and in part because judges make allowances
for their youth and immaturity .... If we compare the sentences imposed on transferred youths
with those imposed on adults, we see that, for each of the violent offense categories and for weap-
ons and "other" crimes, transferred youths are more often sentenced to prison, and for longer peri-
ods of time, than their older counterparts. For drug offenses, transferred youths and older
offenders are about equally likely to be sentenced to prison but transferred offenders receive sig-
nificantly longer sentences on average. For property crimes, transferred offenders are slightly less
likely than adults to be incarcerated in either prison or jail and, when incarcerated, they are sen-
tenced to slightly shorter terms. Overall, when the sentences of transferred youths are compared to
those age eighteen and over, it appears that transferred youths are sentenced more harshly, both in
terms of the probability of receiving a pnson sentence and the length of the sentences they receive.
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As the three cases described in the last section revealed, at least
some participants in the legal process tried to find ways around the
current rigid regime, while many others expressed dismay about what
these mandatory laws made them do to children.2 " These efforts by
lawyers, judges, and laypersons suggest that there is a real need to
move beyond this new transfer regime. Accordingly, in this conclud-
ing section of the essay, we propose installing a series of checks into
the legal response to juvenile homicide in order to prevent not only
the overly aggressive prosecution of children and adolescents as
adults, but also the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.
First, we propose a minimum age for transfer of at least fifteen 211
and preferably sixteen, which is based upon on-going developmental
research into the capacity of children and adolescents to serve as trial
defendants. 212 The requirement of adjudicative competency in crimi-
In other words, we see no evidence that criminal courts recognize a need to mitigate sentences
based on considerations of age and immaturity.
Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 6, at
227, 236-37.
2 10 For a theoretical analysis of how laws allow human beings, especially legal actors, to
harm people, see Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et. al. eds., 1992).
2ii The Institute of Judicial Administration-American Bar Association Standards of 1996
calls for fifteen as the minimum age for transfer. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED:
A BALANCED APPROACH 5 (Robert E. Shepherd, ed. 1996).
212 Thomas Grisso's review of the existing literature on youths' capacities to serve as
trial defendants finds that if future studies affirm what existing ones have already indicated,
then "arguments could be made for a legal presumption of incompetence to stand trial for
youths younger than fourteen, when they face proceedings that may lead to criminal adjudi-
cations (including juvenile court transfer hearings)." Thomas Grisso, What We Know About
Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 149, at 163-64. It
would be a mistake, however, to assume that trying older adolescents as adults avoids the
problem of adjudicative competency. Grisso's review of the literature also revealed:
For youths who are fourteen to sixteen years of age, current research suggests that learning dis-
abilities or emotional disorders often produce delays in cognitive or psychosocial development that
reduce their capacities related to adjudicative competence. Of course, not all such youths need to
be found incompetent, even if they manifest significant trial-related deficits in an evaluation; some
will respond adequately to special efforts to assist them in their decisions as defendants, such as
being taught by their attorney. For some, however, important deficits in defendant abilities will
persist. These conclusions suggest the need to enhance the courts' attention to the potential for ad-
judicative incompetence in this age group, possibly by mandating a review of competence for all
adolescents pnor to their participation in criminal court proceedings or in juvenile proceedings that
may lead to criminal adjudication.
Id. Since delinquent populations also tend to have higher rates of developmental delay due
to "a greater proportion of adolescents with intellectual deficits, learning disabilities, emo-
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nal proceedings, according to Richard J. Bonnie and Thomas Grisso,
"serves three conceptually independent social purposes-preserving
the dignity of the criminal process, reducing the risk of erroneous
convictions, and protecting the defendant's decision-making auton-
omy. '213 The rise of the new transfer regime threatened to undermine
these pillars of a just legal system. If children and adolescents were
not competent to stand trial, then there was a potential constitutional
crisis brewing, since the United States Supreme Court in Drope v.
Missouri held, "It has long been accepted that a person whose mental
condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature
and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel,
and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a
trial. 2t 4 Thus, the frenzied legislative efforts to get tough on juvenile
crime in the 1990's may have unintentionally weakened the very
foundations of the entire criminal justice system.
As we saw in the cases of Lacresha Murray, Lionel Tate, and Na-
thaniel Abraham, prosecuting these children who were under fourteen
as adults produced all of the socially undesirable outcomes that the
concept of adjudicative competency is designed to prevent. Lacre-
sha's case led to a potentially erroneous conviction, Lionel's case re-
vealed that a child without the autonomy to make critical decisions
about his defense wound up with a life sentence without the possibil-
ity of parole, and Nathaniel's case raised international concerns about
the dignity and fairness of the American legal system.
A minimum transfer age of fifteen or sixteen would keep all
children, younger adolescents, and some middle adolescents in the
juvenile justice system."' As Judge Moore reminds us, we can cer-
tainly retain this successful practice from the past: the use of the ju-
venile court to handle the vast majority of cases involving serious and
violent juvenile offenders.216 Contrary to popular myth, the juvenile
tional disorders, and reduced educational and cultural opportunities," prosecuting these ado-
lescents as adults is also problematic. Id.
213 Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offend-
ers, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 149, at 76.
214 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). In addition, as Bonnie and Grisso had
noted, the Supreme Court has held in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993), "that the
legal tests for competence to stand trial and competence to plead guilty (and waive counsel)
are the same." Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 213, at 99, n. 5.
215 It should be noted that adolescents who commit homicide are generally at least fifteen
years of age. "Homicide arrests are rare events under age 13 and infrequent under age 15.
More 15-year-olds are arrested for homicide than the total of all ages under 15, and more
16-year-olds are arrested for homicide than the total of all ages under 16." ZIMRiNG, supra
note 5, at 146.
216 The juvenile court is arguably America's most copied legal innovation:
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court heard cases of juvenile homicide in the early twentieth century,
and it is still capable of doing so in the early twenty-first century.
Yet, even if a minimum threshold of fifteen or sixteen were to be
universally established, there would still be too many adolescents
tried as adults. Many of the delinquent youth who are transferred to
the adult court system suffer from learning disabilities, emotional,
and behavioral problems that make them function at levels below
their chronological age.217 All juveniles who are transferred or who
face being transferred should be evaluated to assess the level of their
functioning and those who operate below the threshold age for trans-
fer, even if they are chronologically above the threshold age, should
also be exempt from transfer.
Another reason why a minimum threshold age is important is
that juvenile crime, unlike adult crime, is a group phenomenon.
Many youth who are only peripheral participants in a crime are trans-
ferred to adult court.218 Many of them, who like all adolescents are
In every American state, juvenile courts have been created to respond to criminal charges against
offenders under a maximum age that varies from sixteen to eighteen. The use of a juvenile court
for youth crime is in fact almost universal throughout the developed nations. No major industrial
democracy incorporates the processing of very young offenders into the normal operation of its
criminal courts. A century after its creation, the juvenile court is the uniform major premise in
policy toward youth crime in every advanced legal system.
Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 207, 207. The juvenile court movement spread across
much of the globe in the early twentieth century. By the mid-1920's, all the states in the
United States, except for Maine and Wyoming, had passed juvenile court laws, and the fol-
lowing countries had enacted similar legislation: Great Britain, 1908; Canada, 1908; Geneva
(Switzerland), 1910; France, 1912; Belgium, 1912; Hungary, 1913; Croatia, 1918; Argen-
tine, 1919; Austria, 1919; Madras (India), 1920; the Netherlands, 1922; Madagascar, 1922;
Bengal (India), 1922; Japan, 1922; Germany, 1923; Brazil, 1923; Spain, 1924; and Mexico,
1926. HENRY H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS N THE UNITED STATES 23 n. I (1927). In addition,
in the following countries they are known to exist but the dates of their formal enactment are un-
known: Australia, South Africa, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden. In Nor-
way, Denmark, Finland, and Portugal there are no juvenile courts, but children are dealt with
under a special code, administered usually by a guardian council or a child-welfare commission,
and not subject to punishment under a certain age. In Russia there was a juvenile court, but since
1922 the whole question ofjuvenile delinquency, including its study and treatment, has been made
a branch of social education, and has been turned over to education authorities; special committees
for cases of 'non-adults' attached to the departments of public educations were entirely substituted
for courts.
Id.
217 On the high prevalence rates of mental disorder among delinquent youths, see Alan E.
Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Making of Delinquent
Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 149, at 33-65.
218 On group involvement in adolescent violence, see ZIMRING, supra note 5, at 29-30.
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particularly vulnerable to peer pressure, could be better served in ju-
venile court with no increased risk to public safety. Punishing all ju-
veniles who are arrested in a group crime equally penalizes them for
a developmental trait that is peculiar to teens. For this reason, we call
for an "accountability" exception to automatic transfer statutes.2 9
There are also a series of checks now in place in some states-
reverse transfer, blended sentences and "youth" discounts-which
have the potential to restore youth to its historical role as a mitigating
factor in the prosecution and punishment of minors. These checks all
provide needed flexibility to the legal response to juvenile homicide
and allow for courts to give due weight to developmental factors
which distinguish youthful defendants from adult defendants.
REVERSE TRANSFER
Approximately twenty-four states have provisions that enable
criminal court judges to send juveniles who have been transferred to
criminal court back to juvenile court.2 Such "reverse transfer" stat-
utes are especially important in jurisdictions that rely extensively on
automatic transfer and direct-file. In these jurisdictions, reverse
transfer can act as a check against overcharging by prosecutors by al-
lowing for an examination of the minor's role in the alleged offense,
potential for rehabilitation, and other factors beyond the minor's age
and the seriousness of the charged offense. Reverse transfer statutes
also mitigate the consequences of overly broad transfer statutes that
sweep into criminal court accomplices, non-violent, and first-time
offenders.
We support reverse waiver statutes but recognize that they are
not a panacea to the current problem of the overuse of transfer. Juve-
nile court judges are better situated to make decisions about transfer-
219 Prosecutors may be concerned that at they time they make charging decisions there is
insufficient information to determine the respective roles of the group members in a crime.
They may also argue that an absolute accountability exception would allow those who order
or solicit juveniles to commit crimes to be immune from transfer. These are legitimate con-
cems which can be addressed either by giving the criminal court judge the option to sentence
a transferred juvenile to juvenile sanctions, if after trial, prosecutors have failed to prove that
the juvenile was a major actor in the crime, by allowing juvenile court judges to transfer ac-
compliccs, or by narrowing the accountability exception to exclude those who plan crimes or
order or solicit others to carry them out.
220 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 95, at 102, 106. The most recent state to adopt a
reverse waiver statute is Illinois. In July, 2002, Governor George Ryan signed into law Pub-
lic Act 92-0665 which gives juveniles, aged fifteen and older, charged with possessing drugs
within 1000 feet of a school, the right to a hearing in criminal court to determine if they will
be tried and sentenced as juveniles or adults. See Act of July 16, 2002, 2002 Ill. Legis. Serv.
P.A. 92-665 (West) (codified at 705 111. Comp. Stat. 405/5-130 (2002)).
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ring youth than are adult court judges. Because juvenile court judges
deal with youth on a daily basis, they are more likely to be sensitive
to the developmental issues that influence juvenile criminality and
are more likely to be knowledgeable about programming alternatives
for youthful defendants. Moreover, adult probation officers and adult
clinicians who often conduct evaluations of juveniles and make rec-
ommendations to criminal court judges in transfer hearings, also lack
the knowledge and training of their juvenile court counterparts. Un-
less and until the criminal court system is re-oriented to make youth
the powerful mitigating factor that it once was, including the
education and training of all the actors in the criminal court in the ba-
sic developmental principles which inform decision-making in the
best juvenile courts, reverse waiver will fail to adequately check the
abuses of the current transfer regime.22'
22 1 The recent case of Miriam White, an eleven-year-old girl who was tried as an adult
for murder in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania's criminal court, demonstrates the failure of the
adult criminal court system in general, and reverse waiver statutes, in particular, to check
abuses of the transfer regime. On August 20, 1999, just five days shy of her twelfth birth-
day, Miriam ran out of her home in South Philadelphia clutching a knife. Unhappy at her
foster home, and wanting to return to a residential placement facility for children with dis-
abilities, she fled in a frenzy and then stabbed the first person she saw on the street, fifty-
five-year-old Rosemary Knight, a hairdresser out walking her dog. The knife penetrated the
upper left chest of Knight, killing her. Under longstanding Pennsylvania law, any person, re-
gardless of age, charged with first-degree murder must be tried as an adult. Miriam was
placed in a segregated unit of the adult jail where she languished while the system tried to
figure out what to do with her. Her attorneys filed a motion asking the criminal court to
transfer Miriam back to the juvenile court system where she could receive age appropriate
services in a secure residential treatment facility. If kept in adult court and convicted of
first-degree murder, Miriam faced a possible life sentence without parole. After a lengthy
hearing, the trial court judge tried to broker a deal in which Miriam would plead guilty to
charges in adult court and be given a blended sentence, a sentence not authorized by Penn-
sylvania's inflexible sentencing statutes. After Miriam and her attorneys rejected the deal,
the judge denied the defense's motion to transfer Miriam back to the juvenile court. Pub-
lished reports revealed that Miriam is mentally retarded, functioning at the level of a six or
seven-year-old and that she has struggled with severe mental illness her entire life. In all
likelihood, she was not competent to decide whether or not to take the plea and may even be
so incompetent that she will never stand trial in the adult court. While these issues play out
in her criminal court case, she will remain in isolation at the adult jail, deprived of the mental
health services she desperately needs to have any chance of succeeding in life. See, e.g.,
Robert Schwartz & Marsha Levick, Sending Miriam White's Case to Adult Court is a Step
Backward, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 11, 2000 available at http://www.jlc.org/home/ up-
dates/updateslinks/press.html; David Zucchino, Girl faces Adult Trial in S. Phila. Slaying:
The Defense Rejected a Deal that Would Have Sent Miriam White, Now 13, for Treatment in
Lieu of Prison, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 3, 2000, at A01; David Zucchino, A System Haunted
by Child Murder Suspect at 11, Miriam White Was Charged in a Woman's Killing, Experts
Examine Her Troubled Past for Clues About Her Future, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 1, 2000, at
AOl; David Zucchino, "A Question of Punishment vs. Rehabilitation; Miriam White, A Mur-
der Suspect at 13, Presents a Dilemma to the Courts: Can She Heal? Could She Kill Again,"
PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 2, 2000, at AOl.
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BLENDED SENTENCES
Although more research on blended sentences needs to be done,
we believe that they should be considered as another possible check
on overly aggressive prosecution. There are several different variants
of what have come to be known as "blended sentencing statutes," and
all have two things in common: greater procedural rights for juvenile
defendants (typically jury trials and bail) and the ability to sentence
juveniles to longer, adult-like, custodial sentences."' There are five
basic models of these statutes which differ in terms of whether the
juvenile or adult court retains the sentencing authority, whether the
sentencing court can sentence the offender to juvenile sanctions, adult
sanctions, or a combination of both, and whether the sanctions are
exclusive (either juvenile or adult sanctions), inclusive (both juvenile
and adult sanctions), or contiguous (first juvenile and then adult sanc-
tions). 223
In theory, blended sentencing statutes seem to meet the concerns
of people who believe that "adult crimes require adult time" as well
as of advocates for keeping as many serious and violent youthful of-
fenders in the juvenile system as possible. By giving juveniles an in-
centive and an opportunity to earn their way out of the adult
sentences, blended sentencing schemes recognize that juveniles are
more amenable to rehabilitation than adults. This approach appreci-
ates that juveniles are developmentally different than adults and that
these differences make juveniles both less culpable for their crimes
and less deserving of the harsh sanctions, which under mandatory
sentencing laws must now be imposed on serious and violent adult
offenders.
222 ZIMRING, supra note 5, at 172-73. See also, Richard E. Redding & James C. Howell,
Blended Sentencing in American Juvenile Courts, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 6, at 145-179.
223 "Juvenile exclusive" statutes give the juvenile court judge the power to sentence a ju-
venile offender to either juvenile or adult sanctions (New Mexico). "Juvenile inclusive"
statutes enable judges to impose both a juvenile and an adult correctional sanction on the of-
fender, but allow the adult sanction to be suspended pending a parole or probation violation
or revocation (Connecticut, Minnesota, and Montana). "Juvenile contiguous statutes" enable
juvenile court judges to sentence minors to lengthy adult sentences but require a review of
whether to impose the sentence on or before the offender ages out of the juvenile system
(Colorado, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas). In "criminal exclusive
statutes," the case originates and is tried in criminal court but judges are given the power to
sentence offenders to either juvenile or adult sanctions. (California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Michigan, Virginia). In "criminal inclusive states, the criminal court has the authority to im-
pose a dual adult and juvenile sentence and to suspend the adult sentence. PATRICIA TORBET
& LINDA SZYMANSKI, STATE LEGISLATIVE REPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 12-13
(1996).
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Unfortunately, the practice of blending sentencing appears to be
falling far short of its conceptual ideals. In most jurisdictions, legis-
latures simply passed blended sentencing statutes, but retained their
transfer statutes. This combination gave prosecutors an additional
option to deal with serious juvenile offenders, and made the benefits
of more flexible sentencing available to judges only if prosecutors
chose to seek blended sentencing instead of transfer. Given the
choice between blended sentencing and transfer, many prosecutors
still prefer transfer. Indeed, in Minnesota it has become common for
prosecutors to file a motion for criminal court certification and then
"bargain down" for blended sentences in juvenile court. Similarly,
the threat of criminal sanctions in New Mexico has led many juve-
niles to plead guilty to obtain juvenile sanctions.224 And in Texas, the
number of transfers to criminal court increased fourfold in the first
decade of that state's experience with blended sentencing. 25 As long
as blended sentencing statutes supplement rather than supplant exist-
ing transfer statutes, it appears that they will fail to live up to their
promise of providing juveniles with procedural due process, and may
not even lower the number of transfers.
Blended sentencing statutes, depending upon how broadly they
are drafted, may also widen the net of juveniles who face adult sanc-
tions. Some blended sentencing statutes contain no age limits and
others apply to both non-violent and violent crimes, exposing many
younger offenders and less serious offenders to adult sanctions who
otherwise would not have been exposed to them. In both the Lacre-
sha Murray and Nathaniel Abraham cases, for example, blended sen-
tences were sought against children who were only eleven years old
at the time they were charged with murder.
Some blended sentencing statutes require that adult sanctions be
automatically imposed for any violation of juvenile sentences, includ-
ing new offenses and technical violations (e.g. curfew, truancy). If
strictly enforced, many juveniles who may be on the road to rehabili-
tation, if they suffer a setback along the way, will receive automatic
adult sanctions for minor transgressions. In Illinois, for example, a
juvenile received an adult five-year sentence when he was arrested
for shoplifting several compact discs from a local record store. 216
224 PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., JUVENILES FACING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS: THREE STATES
THAT CHANGED THE RULES 43 (2000).
225 ZIMRING, supra note 5, at 173.
226 See Tom Ragan, Judge Unsure Hle Can Review Teen's Adult Sentence; Circuit Court
Stay Sought of Juvenile Court Ruling, CHI. TRIB. (McHenry County Ed.), Jan. 27, 2000, at 5.
After Jeffrey Hoey, a sixteen-year-old boy held up a convenience store with a pellet gun in
[Vol. 92
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Blended sentencing statutes, if used in this way, actually set juveniles
up for failure, tie judges hands when the juveniles step out of line,
and ultimately restrict flexibility in sentencing.
Finally, whether or not blended sentences give juvenile offenders
a real chance at earning their way out of adult sanctions depends on
the quality of programming the juvenile system offers young people.
Many of the states which adopted blended sentencing statutes did lit-
tle or nothing to change the programming offered to juvenile offend-
ers in and out of corrections. Without quality programming aimed at
rehabilitating the serious and violent offender, many juveniles who
receive blended sentences will end up in the adult system.227
Early indications also indicate that blended sentencing, like
transfer, is being disproportionately used against minority offend-
ers."28 Although it is too early to call blended sentencing a success
or a failure, and more research needs to be done to judge the impact
of these reforms, the problems discussed herein suggest that blended
sentencing may not be mitigating the harshness of the transfer regime
and may, in fact, be aggravating some of the inequities of that re-
gime.
YOUTH DISCOUNTS
We also support "youth discounts," a reform advocated by Barry
Feld that would use youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing juve-
niles convicted in adult court. Feld, for example, recommends that
fourteen and fifteen-year-olds would receive a discount of between
two-thirds and three fourths of the adult sentence and sixteen and
1999, he became one of the first juveniles to be prosecuted under the state's newly enacted
blended sentencing laws. He was sentenced to two years of juvenile probation and given a
five year suspended adult sentence. When Hoey shoplifted two CDs from a local Best Buy
store a year later, prosecutors brought him back into court and the judge had no choice but to
impose the adult sentence. Id. See also Charles Keeshan, Teen Challenges State's Juvenile
Justice Act, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Nov. 17, 1999, at 8.
227 This is precisely what happened in New Mexico. Although the legislature and the
State's Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee had recommended that the Department of Cor-
rections ("DOC") implement new specialized programming for serious juvenile offenders,
the DOC refused to do so, believing that the small numbers of juveniles expected to be sen-
tenced under the new laws did not justify the effort. When juvenile court judges learned that
no new programming was created and no new money was appropriated to deal with these
youthful offenders, they chose to send them to adult corrections rather than impose juvenile
sanctions. TORBET ET AL., supra note 223, at xiv. Similarly, in Minnesota, an one-year lag
between enactment of the blended sentencing reforms and funding led to delays in the devel-
opment of new programming. Id. at xvi.
228 Both Minnesota and New Mexico case studies demonstrate that African American
and Latino youth make up a disproportionate share of those who receive blended sentences
or are subject to motions for criminal sanctions. TORBET ET AL., supra note 223, at 44.
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seventeen-year-olds would get a discount of between one-half and
one-third of the adult sentences. He would give deeper discounts to
the younger offenders because they have less self-control and less
opportunity to learn to make responsible choices. In Feld's sentenc-
ing scheme, such "youth discounts" only make sense in a sentencing
systems which allow judges to impose "realistic humane and deter-
minate sentences" on adult offenders. 29 Thus, he calls for the aboli-
tion of mandatory minimum sentences and "truth-in-sentencing"
laws that hamstring judicial efforts to use youth as a mitigating fac-
tor.
230
We endorse Feld's proposals because they respect the notion that
juveniles are developmentally different than adults and that these dif-
ferences make juveniles both less culpable for their crimes and less
deserving of the harsh'sanctions, which now must be imposed on se-
rious and violent adult offenders. Even if mandatory minimum and
"truth-in-sentencing" laws are to remain on the books, we call for a
youth exception to such one size fits all sentences. Where we take is-
sue with Feld, however, is over his continued calls to abolish the ju-
venile court as a prerequisite to reforming the sentencing schemes for
juvenile offenders in criminal court. While a full-scale debate with
Feld is beyond the scope of this article and our summary does not do
justice to Feld's well-constructed argument for an integrated sentenc-
ing scheme, we believe that giving criminal court judges greater
flexibility in sentencing juvenile offenders is valuable in and of itself
and that one need not sacrifice the juvenile court to achieve this
worthwhile goal.
Finally, three existing practices merit special attention-the in-
carceration of youth in adult jails and prisons, the use of life without
the possibility of parole sentences for juvenile offenders, and the ju-
venile death penalty. We call for the abandonment of these practices
and use examples both from the turn-of-the century and the present-
day to support our position. These final checks do not prevent the
prosecution of adolescents as adults, but are designed to prevent the
state from inflicting cruel and unusual punishments upon them.
SEGREGATING YOUTH FROM ADULTS IN JAILS AND PRISONS
It is important to re-emphasize the need to segregate youthful of-
fenders from adults in correctional institutions, a leading principle of
the original juvenile court movement. Since at least the early nine-
229 FELD, supra note 15, at 314-319.
23 Id. at 319.
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teenth century, American child-savers have condemned the practice
of placing children in adult prisons due to the likelihood of sexual
abuse and the lack of educational opportunities, except for schooling
in crime."' The criminal justice system, according to its critics in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, transformed malleable
young people into hardened criminals. Sadly, these past concerns
about "our penal machinery and its victims" are a present-day real-
ity. 32 Youth in prisons are more likely to be sexually assaulted than
in juvenile training schools, have fewer educational and counseling
opportunities, and often report that they spend "much of their time
talking to more skilled and experienced offenders who taught them
new techniques of committing crime and methods of avoiding detec-
tion." '233 As a result, as Donna Bishop and Charles Frazier have re-
cently argued, "even if the pains of punishment and confinement
caused most juveniles to wish to avoid returning to prison, what they
learned in prison provided a destructive counterbalance to their posi-
tive intentions." '234 Thus, it appears that history is repeating itself, as
the preliminary research on the new transfer regime reveals that once
again "the criminal justice system may actually contribute to criminal
behavior."23 '
231 Schlossman, supra note 14, at 325-349.
232 See, e.g., E.C. WINES, THE STATES OF PRISONS AND OF CHILD-SAVING INSTITUTIONS IN
THE CIVILIZED WORLD (1879); JOHN P. ALTGELD, OUR PENAL MACHINERY AND ITS VICTIMS
(1886); LOUISE DE KOVEN BOWEN, JUVENILE PROTECTIVE ASS'N OF CHI., BOYS IN THE
COUNTY JAIL: THEIR NEEDS (1913). As a result of recent changes in transfer laws, juveniles
are increasingly being placed in adult correctional facilities. Between 1985 and 1997, the
number of youths under the age of 18 admitted to state prisons more than doubled from 3400
in 1985 to 7400 in 1997. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, JUVENILES
IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 5 (2000).
233 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 205, at 257. Cf FELD, supra note 15, at 272-279.
234 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 205, at 263-264.
235 Id. In his pioneering study, Separating the Men from the Boys: The Comparative Ad-
vantage of Juvenile versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Fel-
ony Offenders, in SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS: A SOURCEBOOK
(James C. Howell et al., eds. 1995), Jeffrey Fagan discovered,
76 percent of those processed in criminal were rearrested, compared to 67 percent of those proc-
essed in juvenile court. An even greater effect was observed for the likelihood of reincarceration;
56 percent of the criminal court group were subsequently incarcerated, compared to 41 percent of
the juvenile court group. Offenders prosecuted in cnminal court also had higher rates of rearrest
for time at risk (2.85 offenses) than those prosecuted in juvenile court (1.67 offenses), and they
were rearrested more quickly (457 days compared to 553 days for those processed in juvenile
court.
By comparing the experiences of transferred and non-transferred juvenile offenders in
Florida, Bishop, Frazier and their colleagues have found similar results to Fagan research on
New York and New Jersey. They calculated that,
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LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES
Even more disturbing is the trend to sentence more youthful of-
fenders to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The over-
whelming majority of American jurisdictions permit life without the
possibility of parole sentences for juvenile offenders, and in Wash-
ington, children as young as eight can be sentenced to life; in Ver-
mont, ten-year-olds can receive this sentence.23 6  As the cases of
Lionel Tate and Nathaniel Abraham demonstrate, conviction of first-
degree murder in adult court, in some states, can bring mandatory life
without the possibility of parole sentences for pre-teens.237
In The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets, Jane Addams, the
Nobel Prize winning social worker and crusader for the juvenile
court, emphasized that youth above all is about possibility and that
"we may either smother the divine fire of youth or we may feed it. ' '238
We reject life without the possibility of parole sentences because they
smother the divine fire of youth. They are an expression of despair
that has no place in any system that aims to take seriously youth as a
mitigating factor.
Over the short term, 30 percent of the transfers were rearrested, compared to 19 percent of those
processed in the juvenile court. Transfers were also more likely than those processed in the juve-
nile system to be arrested for most serious (felony) offenses. The incidence of offending was also
higher in the transfer group: transfers had a reanest rate of 0.54 offenses per person year of expo-
sure, compared to 0.32 for those retained in the juvenile system. The transfers also reoffended
more quickly (135 days) than those processed in juvenile court (227 days).
Bishop & Frazier, supra note 209, at 248.
236 LYNN COTHERN, COORDINATING COUNCIL ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY 10-12 (2000). See also Wayne A. Logan,
Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOR-
ESTL. REV. 681 (1998).
237 Legal challenges to life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders, on grounds
that such sentences are disproportionate to the crime in violation of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments and similar state constitutional provisions,
have met with only limited success. Compare Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 585 (9th Cir.
1996) (affirming constitutionality of life sentence for fifteen-year-old convicted of murder),
and State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming life sentence of
thirteen-year-old convicted of murder), with Workman v. Kentucky, 429 S.W.2d 374, 377
(Ky. Ct. App. 1968) (invalidating mandatory life sentence of fourteen-year-olds convicted
of rape), and Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 946 (Nev. 1989) (finding life sentence of
thirteen-year-old convicted of murder to be "cruel and unusual"). A little over one hundred
years after the juvenile court's birth, an Illinois trial court found that a mandatory life sen-
tence to a fifteen-year-old accomplice in a double homicide was unconstitutional. Janan
Hanna, Mandatory Life Term for Teen Rejected, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2000, at 1. This deci-
sion was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300 (2002).
238 ADDAMS, supra note 45, at 161.
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JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
The ultimate expression of despair in the criminal court system is
the death penalty for juvenile offenders. 239  The United States is one
of only seven countries known to have executed offenders who were
juveniles at the time of their crimes in the 1990's; the others countries
were Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the Democ-
ratic Republic of Congo. Yemen and Pakistan have recently
amended their laws to outlaw such executions. In the year 2002, the
United States executed three juvenile offenders, all of whom were
from Texas, and has executed eighteen juvenile offenders since 1990,
more than the rest of the world combined.24 °
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court, in a landmark deci-
sion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, upheld the constitutionality of
the death penalty for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds by a slim one-
vote majority. 24' The year before the court had ruled that it was
"cruel and unusual punishment" to execute those under age sixteen.242
Of the thirty-eight death penalty states, twenty-two of them currently
allow for juvenile offenders to be executed; nineteen set the mini-
mum age at sixteen and the remaining four execute only seventeen-
year-old offenders.243
There are many reasons why we oppose the juvenile death pen-
alty. For the purposes of this article, we will focus on the basic prin-
ciples of child and adolescent development which underpin the
juvenile court: children, including sixteen and seventeen-year-olds,
are not adults and their immaturity, impulsivity, lack of judgment and
life experiences make them less culpable than adults for their crimes.
Indeed, recent medical research involving brains scans reveals that
the adolescent brain is different than the adult brain and that the dif-
239 Alex Kotlowitz, The Execution of Youth, NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2000, at 23.
240 For a listing of reported worldwide executions since 1990, see the website of the In-
ternational Justice Project, Reported Worldwide Executions of Juveniles Since 1990, at
http://www.intemationaljusticeproject.org/juvworld.cfm. For a history of the juvenile death
penalty in the United States and an up-to-date account of the juveniles who are on death
row, see Victor Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Death Sentences and Executions for Ju-
venile Crimes, January 1, 1973- December 31, 2002, at
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm. For a listing of reported worldwide
executions since 1990, see the website of the International Justice Project at
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/juvworld.cfm.
241 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
242 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
243 Steven Drizin & Steven Harper, Old Enough to Kill, Old Enough to Die, S. F.
CHRON., Apr. 16, 2000, at 1. In 2002, Indiana became the most recent state to raise the
minimum age for death penalty eligibility to eighteen. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (2002).
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ferences are in very areas of the brain-the pre-frontal lobes-that
regulate impulse control, and judgment. This brain research refutes
commonly-held notions that the brain was fully developed before
adolescence and provides additional scientific support for the notion
that youth must serve to mitigate adolescent criminal conduct.244
Our opposition to the juvenile death penalty is also informed by
perhaps the most famous case in the Chicago Homicide Database:
the brutal murder of Bobby Franks, age fourteen, in 1924 by Nathan
Leopold and Richard Loeb. Leopold (age nineteen) and Loeb (age
eighteen), sons of Hyde Park millionaires and students at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, had randomly selected, kidnapped, and killed Franks,
a neighborhood boy and distant cousin of Loeb's, on his way home
from school. After being caught, Leopold and Loeb had eagerly con-
fessed, but showed no remorse. They soon became known to the
public as the "boy-murderers" who had committed the "crime of the
century.'
241
Clarence Darrow, the boys' attorney, in order to avoid a trial byjury and the pitfalls of an insanity defense, had them plead guilty and
take their chances with a sentencing hearing before a lone judge. 46
Throughout the hearing Darrow highlighted the youth of the accused
and stressed that there had never been a case in Chicago in which the
244 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, TEENAGE BRAIN: A WORK IN PROGRESS
(2001), at www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/teenbrain.cfm. See also Matt Crenson, Rebels Have a
Cause: Brain Change, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 2, 1001, at El; Sharon Begley, Getting Inside a
Teen Brain: Hormones Aren't the Only Reason Adolescents Act Crazy. Their Gray Matter
Differs From Children 's and Adults, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, at 58; Sharon Brownlee et
al., Inside the Teen Brain: Behavior Can Be Baffling When Young Minds Are Taking Shape,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 9, 1999, at 44-48.
245Chicago Homicide Database, supra note 28, Case No. 6034. That case, dated May 22,
1924 reads:
Franks, Robt.-Age 13-His nude body found in a culvert at 118th St and Penna. R.R. where he
was hidden by Richard Loeb and Nathan J. Leopold. The two were indicted on June 5th after con-
fessing to the murder giving as their motive that it was an "experiment in sensation" as well as the$10,000 they asked as ransom. 8 dist. 9/10/24. Each sentenced to life term in Joliet Pen. On the
Murder charge and 99 years for the kidnapping - Caverly.
The best account of this famous case and the subsequent histories of Leopold and Loeb is
HAL HIGDON, THE CRIME OF THE CENTURY: THE LEOPOLD AND LOEB CASE (1975). For an
analysis of how public reactions to the case have changed over time, see Paula Fass, Making
and Remaking an Event: The Leopold and Loeb Case in American Culture, 80 J. OF AM.
HIST. 919 (1993).
246 Darrow's plea is reprinted in MAUREEN MCKERNAN, THE AMAZING CRIME AND TRIAL
OF LEOPOLD AND LOEB 160-236 (1957). For more about the hearing see also A Symposium
of Comments From the Legal Profession, 15 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395
(1924) (discussing the Loeb-Leopold murder).
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state had put to death a defendant who plead guilty and was under
twenty-three years of age.247 Darrow also called upon psychiatrists
and experts on juvenile delinquency to explain the boys' antisocial
behavior. The testimony of "these men of science" attracted interna-
tional attention to the case, and Robert McCormick, the publisher of
the Chicago Tribune, even offered Sigmund Freud $25,000 to visit
Chicago and psychoanalyze Leopold and Loeb. Freud, however, de-
clined the offer.248
In his legendary summation, Darrow declared:
I suppose civilization will survive if your honor hangs them. But it will
be a terrible blow that you shall deal. Your honor will be turning back
over the long, long road we have traveled. You will be turning back
from the protection of youth and infancy. You honor would be turning
back from the treatment of children .... You'would be dealing a stag-
gering blow to all that has been done in the city of Chicago in the last
twenty years for the protection of infancy and childhood and youth.
249
Darrow not only evoked Chicago's historic role in establishing
child-saving institutions, such as the juvenile court, but also asked
what kind of precedent the judge would set if he sentenced these boys
to death. He prophesized:
Your honor, if in this court a boy of eighteen and a boy of nineteen
should be hanged on a plea of guilty, in violation of every precedent of
the past, in violation of the policy of the law to take care of the young, in
violation of all the progress that has been made and of the humanity that
has been shown in the care of the young; in violation of the law that
places boys in reformatories instead of prison-if your honor in violation
of all that and in the face of all the past should stand here in Chicago
alone to hang a boy on a plea of guilty, then we are turning our faces
backward toward the barbarism which once possessed the world. If your
honor can hang a boy eighteen, some other judge can hang him at seven-
teen, or sixteen, or fourteen. Some day, if there is any such thing as pro-
gress in the world, if there is any spirit of humanity that is working in the
hearts of men, some day men would look back upon this as a barbarous
247MCKERNAN, supra note 246, at 162. There were at a least a few cases in which the
state executed minors who did not plead guilty. See, e.g., Chicago Homicide Database, su-
pra note 28, Case No. 806, Feb. 27, 1888 ("Gaughan, Maggie, killed by Zeph Davis, a col-
ored boy, who was arrested, tried, and executed."). For an excellent analysis of this case,
especially how the city's newspapers used the case to structure narratives about the criminal
justice system, see DALE, supra note 31.
248 PETER GAY, FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME 453-54 (1988).
249 MCKERNAN, supra note 246, at 186-187.
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age which deliberately set itself in the way of progress, humanity and
sympathy, and committed an unforgivable act.
2 50
Although Judge Caverly rejected the psychological testimony, he
decided against imposing the death penalty. He explained,
[I]n choosing imprisonment instead of death, the court is moved chiefly
by the consideration of the age of the defendants, boys of eighteen and
nineteen years. It is not for the court to say that he will not, in any case,
enforce capital punishment as an alternative, but the court believes it is
within his province to decline to impose the sentence of death on persons
who are not of full age.
251 He added, "This determination appears to be in accordance with
the progress of criminal law all over the world and with the dictates
of enlightened humanity. 21 2 The judge spared the lives of Leopold
and Loeb, but he recommended that department of public welfare
never "admit these defendants to parole." '253 Thus, it was likely but
not definite that the "boy-murderers" would spend the rest of their
lives in prison.
As it turned out, Richard Loeb was murdered in prison in 1936,
but Nathan Leopold, after spending thirty-three years in prison was
paroled. More significantly, Leopold both in prison and afterwards
led a productive life. In 1933, for instance, Leopold and Loeb
founded and ran the Stateville Correspondence School for prisoners.
While in prison, Leopold also learned twelve languages, reclassified
the prison library, gathered statistics on parole, became an X-ray
technician, registered inmates for the draft for WWII, volunteered for
a medical project designed to find a cure for malaria, and wrote his
autobiography Life Plus 99 Years. After being paroled, Leopold
worked in a hospital, married, attended graduate school, taught at the
University of Puerto Rico, researched leprosy, and authored The
Birds of Puerto Rico. On the tenth anniversary of his release from
250/d. at 231.
251 Id. at 298. In his autobiography, Leopold noted:
If Judge Caverly meant literally what he said in his opinion, the whole elaborate psychiatric de-
fense presented in our behalf and the Herculean efforts of our brilliant counsel were of no avail.
The only thing that influenced him to choose imprisonment instead of death was our youth; we
need only have introduced our birth certificates in evidence!
NATHAN LEOPOLD, LIFE PLUS 99 YEARS 82 (1958).
252 MCKERNAN, supra note 246, at 298.
253 ,
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prison, Leopold wrote some friends and evaluated his post-prison ex-
istence. He noted, "Negatively, at least I have not committed an-
other felony nor otherwise got into trouble. From the point of view
of the statistics of parole violation, I qualify as a 'success.' But hon-
estly, I think it has gone a bit farther than just that. I've done a few
things that I think needed doing in the professional field." He added,
"My reputation, locally, is good; people here, in general, not only tol-
erate me but positively like me! In a word, even if it sounds very
immodest, I believe that society has not been the loser in granting me,
at long last, my liberty." '54 When Leopold died on August 30, 1971,
he also gave back to society. He willed his body to the University of
Puerto Rico and his eyes to the university's eye bank. The day after
his death, an elderly widow received one of his comeas; the other
went to a man. 55
We believe that the life of Nathan Leopold reveals why the legal
response to juvenile homicide should not include either life in prison
without the possibility of parole or the death penalty. Such sentences
of despair are cruel and unusual punishments, which should not re-
main part of our nation's justice system.
25~4 HIGDON supra note 245, at 333.
255 Id. at 340.
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